Clear But Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit\u27s Invalidity Standard by Taylor, David O.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 21 Volume XXI 
Number 2 Volume XXI Book 2 Article 7 
2011 
Clear But Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit's Invalidity Standard 
David O. Taylor 
Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law, dotaylor@smu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David O. Taylor, Clear But Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit's Invalidity Standard, 21 Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 293 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol21/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Clear But Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit's Invalidity Standard 
Cover Page Footnote 
Attorney, Dallas, TX; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2003; B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Texas A&M University, 
1999. I thank Richard J. Johnson, Jr. for his comments on an early draft of this Article. As always, my wife 
Rachel deserves the most thanks. The views expressed in this Article, as well as any errors, are my own. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol21/iss2/7 
C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2011 10:20 PM 
 
293 
Clear But Unconvincing: The Federal 
Circuit’s Invalidity Standard 
David O. Taylor* 
ABSTRACT 
The Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity of patent 
claims is clear.  The Federal Circuit always requires clear and 
convincing evidence to prove that a patent claim is invalid.  The 
rationale behind this standard, however, is unconvincing.  There 
are significant reasons to believe that the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) rarely considers the most relevant 
prior art and that, instead, alleged infringers often find prior art that 
is more relevant than the prior art considered by the USPTO.  It 
defies logic to apply the clear and convincing burden where the 
USPTO considered only prior art that is less relevant than the prior 
art asserted in litigation.  And while the Federal Circuit relies upon 
35 U.S.C. § 282 as dictating the clear and convincing burden of 
proof, the statute includes no such burden.  Indeed, every other 
circuit court of appeals has indicated that the statutory presumption 
of validity only requires a presumption that the USPTO correctly 
ruled upon the evidence in front of it—not that the USPTO 
considered the most relevant prior art or that it, illogically, 
correctly ruled upon evidence it did not even consider.  To 
encourage the disclosure of relevant prior art to the USPTO, to 
increase patent quality, to ensure that patents serve their 
constitutional purpose of rewarding inventors for disclosing 
 
A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexxi/book2.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
* Attorney, Dallas, TX; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2003; B.S., Mechanical 
Engineering, Texas A&M University, 1999.  I thank Richard J. Johnson, Jr. for his 
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discoveries, and to reduce transaction costs associated with 
ultimately invalid patents, the clear and convincing burden of 
proving invalidity should be replaced with a preponderance burden 
when litigation involves unconsidered, material prior art. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity of patent 
claims is clear.  The Federal Circuit always requires clear and 
convincing evidence to prove that a patent claim is invalid.1  The 
rationale behind this standard, however, is unconvincing.  The 
Federal Circuit requires clear and convincing evidence because it 
presumes that the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) has considered the most relevant prior art and still 
allowed the patent claims to issue.2  The Federal Circuit believes 
courts should overturn the USPTO’s decision only if there is clear 
and convincing evidence that the USPTO made a mistake.  The 
presumption underlying the Federal Circuit’s standard, however, is 
flawed—significantly flawed. 
 
 1 See cases cited infra note 68.  
 2 See infra Part I.B. 
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There are many reasons to believe that the USPTO rarely 
considers the most relevant prior art.3  The USPTO has limited 
resources and patent examiners lack incentives to find the most 
relevant prior art.4  Moreover, patent prosecution is largely an ex 
parte procedure that excludes public participation.  The Federal 
Circuit’s standard for invalidity discourages patent applicants from 
even investigating prior art.  As a result of this confluence of 
factors, it is likely that, after patents issue, parties alleged to have 
infringed those patents often find prior art that is more relevant 
than the prior art considered by the USPTO. 
While it is logical for courts to apply the clear and convincing 
burden of proof to patent claims where the USPTO considered 
prior art that is more relevant than prior art asserted in litigation—
or at least just as relevant as that prior art—it is not logical to apply 
this burden where the USPTO considered only prior art that is less 
relevant than the prior art asserted in the litigation.  And while the 
Federal Circuit relies upon 35 U.S.C. § 282 as requiring the clear 
and convincing burden of proof, the statute includes no such 
burden.5  The statute merely requires that parties asserting 
invalidity bear the burden of establishing invalidity and that courts 
and juries presume that patents are valid.6  While the Federal 
Circuit has latched onto the statutory presumption of validity in 
particular as requiring the clear and convincing burden of proof in 
all instances, every other circuit court of appeals that interpreted 
the presumption before the creation of the Federal Circuit came to 
a different conclusion.7  Instead, the other circuit courts concluded 
that the statutory presumption of validity requires only a 
presumption that the USPTO correctly ruled upon the evidence in 
front of it—not that the USPTO considered the most relevant prior 
art or that it, illogically, correctly ruled upon evidence it did not 
even consider. 
This Article reviews the Federal Circuit’s standard for proving 
invalidity of patents and its rationale for that standard, analyzes 
 
 3 See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 4 Id.  
 5 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).  
 6 See id. 
 7 See infra Part III.B.3.b.  
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problems associated with the standard and the rationale, and 
concludes that the Federal Circuit’s standard should be replaced 
with a new standard that is supported by logic, Supreme Court 
precedent, and the standards articulated by every other circuit court 
of appeals.  This Article proposes replacing the clear and 
convincing burden of proof with a preponderance burden of proof 
when litigation involves unconsidered, material prior art. 
Part I of this Article examines the Federal Circuit’s standard 
for proving invalidity of patent claims, in terms of both its 
historical development and the rationale allegedly supporting it.  
Part II considers some of the problems associated with the Federal 
Circuit’s standard, from both a logical as well as a utilitarian 
standpoint.  Part III proposes and evaluates the support and 
benefits of replacing the clear and convincing burden of proof with 
a preponderance burden of proof when litigation involves 
unconsidered, material prior art. 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STANDARD FOR PROVING INVALIDITY 
Since its formation, the Federal Circuit has adhered to a strict 
standard for proving that a patent is invalid.  Under that standard, a 
party challenging the validity of a patent, to succeed in its 
challenge, always must prove invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence.8  The rationale for this strict standard is that the USPTO, 
in its expertise, has approved the patent in view of the most 
relevant prior art, and the belief that the USPTO’s approval should 
be respected absent clear and convincing evidence that the USPTO 
made a mistake.9 
A. The Standard: Clear and Convincing Evidence in Every 
Circumstance 
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 282 states that a patent shall 
be presumed valid and that the burden of proving invalidity shall 
rest on the party asserting invalidity: 
 
 8 See cases cited infra note 68.  
 9 See discussion infra Part I.B.  
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A patent shall be presumed valid.  Each claim of a 
patent (whether in independent, dependent, or 
multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims; 
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be 
presumed valid even though dependent upon an 
invalid claim. . . . The burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest 
on the party asserting such invalidity.10 
Nowhere, however, does 35 U.S.C. § 282 explain exactly what 
the burden of proving invalidity is.  Is the burden a preponderance 
of the evidence?  Clear and convincing evidence?11  Evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt?  On its face, the statute does not 
answer these questions.  Stepping into this void, the Federal Circuit 
has interpreted the first sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 282—the statutory 
presumption of validity—to mean that an alleged infringer always 
must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.12  Indeed, 
the Federal Circuit has interpreted the statutory presumption of 
validity to set forth a clear and convincing burden of proof 
regardless of whether the USPTO actually considered the most 
relevant prior art.13 
1. Historical Development Of The Standard 
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 and vested in it 
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve appeals of claims arising under the 
patent laws.14  It did so in response to concerns about both a lack 
of uniformity in the interpretation of the patent laws by the circuit 
 
 10 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 11 The “clear and convincing” burden of proof is an intermediate burden that lies 
somewhere between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and a “preponderance of the evidence.” 
Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  “Clear and 
convincing” evidence is evidence that produces in the mind of the trier of fact an abiding 
conviction that the truth of the factual contentions are highly probable.  Id. 
 12 See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359–60 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 13 See, e.g., R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 14 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982); H.R. Rpt. No. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981); S. Rpt. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981). 
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courts and the “forum shopping” that these divergent 
interpretations had generated.15  The Federal Circuit quickly 
exercised that jurisdiction in its first two years to render a series of 
early opinions interpreting the statutory presumption of validity 
and articulating the standard for proving invalidity of patents. 
a) Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory 
presumption of validity traces its roots to an opinion written by 
Chief Judge Markey, the first chief judge of the Federal Circuit, 
prior to the court’s formation.16  In Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. 
International Trade Commission,17 the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
reviewed an administrative law judge’s conclusion that the 
presumption of validity does not exist when the most pertinent 
prior art was neither presented to nor considered by the USPTO.18  
The court held that this conclusion was “unsound.”19 
While conceding that rebuttal of the presumption of validity 
may be more easily and more often achieved by relying on prior art 
more pertinent than the prior art considered by the USPTO, the 
court explained that until the prior art actually renders the claimed 
invention anticipated or obvious, the presumption of validity is not 
rebutted and “continues alive and well.”20  The court interpreted 35 
U.S.C. § 282 as placing the burden of coming forward with 
evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the party 
 
 15 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 820 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  In the context of the subject of this Article—the standard for proving 
invalidity—it is ironic that the Federal Circuit was formed to resolve concerns about both 
the lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the patent laws and forum shopping.  As 
discussed below, the Federal Circuit adopted an interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 282 and an 
evidentiary standard for proving invalidity that conflict with the views of every other 
circuit court of appeals, views that are expressed plainly in numerous opinions that pre-
date the establishment of the Federal Circuit. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.b. 
 16   See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A. 
1978); see also In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
 17 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 18 Id. at 632. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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asserting that a patent is invalid, and concluded that the burden of 
persuasion always remains upon the party asserting invalidity, 
regardless of whether the most pertinent prior art was considered 
by the USPTO.21  Moreover, the court noted that the USPTO’s 
failure to cite particular prior art does not necessarily mean that 
that prior art was not considered by the examiner because the 
examiner may have considered it and determined that it was 
unworthy of citation.22 
The court ultimately held that the statute does not make the 
presumption applicable in some situations but not in others.23  
Instead, the court indicated that the distinction between situations 
in which the most pertinent prior art was considered by the USPTO 
and situations in which it was not is “judge-made.”24  As a result, 
 
 21 Id. at 632–33.  Notably, the court justified its holding with respect to the 
presumption of validity by highlighting the burden of persuasion, which is stated 
separately in 35 U.S.C. § 282. Id. at 633 n.8.  Some have concluded that the presumption 
of validity only places the initial burden of coming forward with evidence on the alleged 
infringer. See B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement 
Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 380, 387 (2008).  And at least one Federal 
Circuit opinion supports that view. See Lear-Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 
881, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The presumption of patent validity found in 35 U.S.C. § 282 
is but a procedural device which places on a party asserting invalidity the initial burden 
of going forward to establish a prima facie case on that issue.”).  The resolution of which 
party bears the initial burden of coming forward with evidence, however, fails to resolve 
the issue of what the exact burden of persuasion should be in any particular context. 
 22 Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633 n.9.  This statement—that the failure to cite 
prior art does not necessarily mean that it was not considered because the examiner may 
have determined that it was unworthy of citation—does not justify the court’s sweeping 
conclusion that the burden of persuasion always remains upon the party asserting 
invalidity, regardless of whether the most pertinent prior art was considered by the 
USPTO.  Just because a rationale is not always true, that fact does not justify a standard 
that effectively assumes that the rationale is never true.  Nor does this statement support 
applying the clear and convincing burden regardless of whether the most pertinent prior 
art actually was considered by the USPTO.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 23 Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633.  While it is true that the statute requires the 
application of the presumption of validity to every patent, the statute does not indicate 
that the presumption of validity requires the same evidentiary burden of persuasion to 
apply to every piece of prior art regardless of whether the USPTO considered it.  
 24 Id.  This criticism lacks any force.  The statutory presumption of validity simply 
codified the common law presumption of validity. H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82-1923 (1952).  
The common law recognized the same distinction between situations in which the most 
pertinent prior art was considered by the USPTO and situations in which it was not. See 
H.F. Harmann, Editorial Notes, The New Patent Act and the Presumption of Validity, 21 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 576–78 (1953) (cataloguing cases predating the 1952 Patent 
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the court criticized holdings of other courts that the presumption is 
“weakened,” “undercut,” “dissipated,” or “destroyed” in this 
situation.25  Nevertheless, the court reiterated that the burden of 
persuasion may be more easily met by evidence consisting of more 
pertinent prior art than that considered by the examiner.26 
Viewed in context, Solder Removal Co. simply rejected the 
proposition that the burden of persuasion ever shifts from alleged 
infringers to patent owners.  Whatever the presumption of validity 
means, it cannot contradict the clear statutory language that the 
“burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof 
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”27  Moreover, it is 
important to note that the court was not squarely presented with the 
question of the appropriate burden for proving invalidity—clear 
and convincing evidence, a preponderance of the evidence, or 
evidence proving invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt—and 
therefore did not resolve that question.  That said, it did indicate—
twice—that the burden of persuasion may be more easily met by 
evidence consisting of more pertinent prior art than that considered 
by the examiner.28 
 
 
Act making distinctions based on whether the most pertinent prior art was considered by 
the USPTO). 
 25 Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633.  The court did not recognize that if the 
presumption of validity is restricted to placing the initial burden of coming forward with 
evidence on the alleged infringer, this initial burden would be destroyed if the alleged 
infringer is able to meet this burden.  In that situation, the burden of coming forward with 
evidence would revert to the patent owner. 
 26 Id.  The court noted that the application of 35 U.S.C. § 282 has “suffered from 
analogy of the presumption itself to the deference due administrative agencies.” Id. at 633 
n.10.  In this way the court seemingly recognized that this “analogy”—which is actually 
the rationale underlying the presumption of validity itself—does not fully support its 
conclusion. 
 27 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 28 In the Federal Circuit’s very first opinion, S. Corp. v. United States, the court set a 
path that was doomed to conflict with every other circuit court of appeals on the issue of 
the standard governing allegations of invalidity.  The en banc court held that the holdings 
of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals would bind the Federal 
Circuit. 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).  Thus, the holding of Solder 
Removal Company v. U.S. International Trade Commission would act as controlling 
precedent on future panels of the Federal Circuit. 
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b) SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission 
In SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. International Trade 
Commission,29 the Federal Circuit issued its first opinion 
addressing the statutory presumption of validity articulated in 35 
U.S.C. § 282.30  The court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Nies, 
began by adopting the holding of Solder Removal Co., indicating 
that the presumption of validity is not altered by the introduction at 
trial of more relevant prior art than the prior art considered at the 
USPTO.31  The court then effectively restated the major holdings 
of Solder Removal Co.: the presumption of validity places both the 
burden of going forward with evidence and the burden of 
persuasion upon the party asserting invalidity, and if a party 
introduces prior art more relevant than that considered by the 
examiner, the party is more likely to carry its burden of 
persuasion.32 
The court went further, however, and addressed whether any 
burden of persuasion should apply to the question of invalidity.  
Criticizing the Commission’s statement that there must be “clear 
and convincing evidence of invalidity,” the court deemed it 
“inappropriate” to speak in terms of a particular burden of proof 
being necessary to reach a legal conclusion on the issue of 
obviousness.33  The court went on to note that while “certain facts 
in patent litigation must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence, the formulation of a legal conclusion on validity from 
the established facts is a matter reserved for the court.”34  Then the 
Federal Circuit noted that it was a reviewing court whose role is 
 
 29 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 30 SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 374–75 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
 31 Id. at 375. 
 32 Id.  Other early Federal Circuit cases relied upon SSIH Equip. S.A. for one or both of 
these points, presumably because SSIH Equip. S.A. was the first Federal Circuit opinion 
to make the same points. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 
1563, 1566 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 282 permanently places the burden of 
proving facts necessary to a conclusion of invalidity on the party asserting such 
invalidity). 
 33 SSIH Equip. S.A., 718 F.2d at 375. 
 34 Id. (citing Radio Corp. v. Radio Labs., 293 U.S. 1 (1934)). 
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limited to determining whether the facts on which a judgment of 
validity or invalidity was based were satisfactorily established and 
whether those facts form an adequate predicate for the ultimate 
legal conclusion of obviousness.35 
When SSIH Equipment S.A. is viewed in context, other than 
adopting the holdings of Solder Removal Co., the court merely 
noted that neither trial courts nor the Federal Circuit are bound to 
apply any burden of proof on the ultimate issue of obviousness, 
although the clear and convincing burden of proof does apply to 
“certain” unidentified facts.36  Moreover, the court did not even 
consider the question of whether the clear and convincing burden 
of proof on questions of fact related to invalidity is appropriate in 
every instance, or whether some lesser burden of proof should 
apply in certain circumstances. 
c) Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp. 
In Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,37 the Federal Circuit, in 
an opinion by Chief Judge Markey, the author of Solder Removal 
Co., again held that the introduction of more pertinent prior art 
than that considered by the examiner does not weaken or destroy 
the presumption of validity or shift the burden of persuasion.38  
The court noted that the introduction of more pertinent prior art 
than that considered by the examiner nevertheless can facilitate the 
carrying of the burden of persuasion by the party claiming 
invalidity by requiring the party supporting validity to come 
forward with countervailing evidence.39  Again, however, the court 
did not consider the question of the appropriate burden of proof 
required to prove invalidity, or whether that burden is lower in 
some circumstances. 
 
 35 SSIH Equip. S.A., 718 F.2d at 375. 
 36 Id. 
 37 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 38 Id. at 1534. 
 39 Id. 
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d) Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
In Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,40 the Federal Circuit, in 
another opinion by Chief Judge Markey, for the first time reached 
the question of the appropriate burden of proof required to prove 
invalidity.  The court’s discussion of this issue, however, is dicta—
the issue did not influence the judgment and was neither defended 
nor attacked on appeal.41  Thus, it should be recognized that the 
court’s opinion has little, if any, precedential value.  Nonetheless, 
it is important to recognize the content and reasoning of the 
opinion. 
The court began by again rejecting the proposition that where 
pertinent or relevant prior art was not considered by the USPTO 
the presumption of validity is severely weakened and eroded.42  
The court justified this holding by noting that there is virtually 
always pertinent and relevant prior art not considered by the 
USPTO.43  And the court again recognized that the patent 
challenger’s burden may be carried more easily when it utilizes 
unconsidered prior art that is more relevant than the prior art 
considered by the USPTO.44 
The Court went further, however.  It rejected the proposition 
that when “any relevant” non-considered prior art is introduced, 
the burden upon the patent challenger is thereby changed from a 
requirement for clear and convincing proof to one of proof by a 
mere preponderance.45  The court concluded that the introduction 
 
 40 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 41 The court noted portions of a district court’s opinion that reflected the law of the 
various regional circuits prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit “did not influence 
the judgment appealed from and are neither defended nor attacked on appeal,” and 
indicated its disagreement. Id. at 1548. 
 42 Id. at 1549 n.17. 
 43 Id.  It is unclear how the fact that there is virtually always pertinent and relevant 
prior art not considered by the USPTO justifies a holding that the presumption of validity 
is never weakened and eroded, but that is what the court held.  Moreover, this concession 
undermines the statement in Solder Removal Co. that the USPTO’s failure to cite 
particular prior art does not necessarily mean that that prior art was not considered by the 
examiner because the examiner may have considered it and determined that it was 
unworthy of citation. Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 
n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.7. 
 44 Connell, 722 F.2d at 1549. 
 45 Id. at 1549. 
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of art or other evidence not considered by the USPTO does not 
change the burden and does not change the requirement that that 
evidence establish invalidity clearly and convincingly.46 
It is important to note that the court’s consideration and 
resolution of the issue of the appropriate burden of proof to apply 
was limited to the question of whether any relevant, non-
considered prior art changes the burden of proof from clear and 
convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence.  The 
court did not address the more difficult question of whether prior 
art that is more relevant than prior art considered by the USPTO 
reduces the burden of persuasion.  The court’s reasoning, however, 
foreshadowed how it would decide the question. 
e) American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc. 
In American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,47 the 
Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Rich, rejected a 
jury instruction explaining that the burden of proof shifts from the 
accused infringer to the patent owner when the accused infringer 
cites prior art that is more pertinent than the prior art utilized by 
the patent examiner.48  This instruction would have emphasized 
that, in this circumstance, the presumption of validity “disappears” 
and the patent owner has the burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence.49  The court found this instruction erroneous in 
two respects.  First, according to the court, it misassigned the 
burden of proof that 35 U.S.C. § 282 mandates rests upon the party 
asserting invalidity whether or not the most pertinent prior art was 
considered by the examiner.50  Second, according to the court, it 
failed to explain accurately the presumption of validity.51 
On the second point, the court recognized a “prevailing 
confusion” in the cases over the meaning and effect of the 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 48 Id. at 1358. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  In this regard, the Federal Circuit rejected the contrary holding of the Ninth 
Circuit in Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980).  The Federal 
Circuit court’s holding reflects, yet again, the holding of Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm., 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 51 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1358. 
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presumption of validity, engendered by assertions that under 
various circumstances the presumption is retained, destroyed, 
strengthened, or weakened, thus resulting in the shifting of the 
burden of proof or the changing of the burden of proof.52  After 
reviewing the history of the codification of the presumption of 
validity, in which Judge Rich played a significant role,53 the court 
emphasized that the “attacker” of a patent relying on prior art 
already considered by the patent examiner has the added burden of 
overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government 
agency presumed to have properly done its job.54  In particular, 
patent examiners are presumed to have some expertise in 
interpreting the prior art and to be familiar with the level of skill in 
the art and, in some cases, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences may have approved of the issuance of the patent.55 
The court conceded that when an attacker relies on prior art or 
other evidence not already considered by the USPTO, there is no 
reason to defer to the USPTO insofar as its effect on validity is 
concerned.56  The court nevertheless held that the burden of proof 
should still be clear and convincing evidence in this situation.57  In 
the court’s view, the production of new prior art not before the 
USPTO eliminates, or at least reduces, the element of deference 
due the USPTO, thereby partially, if not wholly, discharging the 
attacker’s burden, but neither shifting nor lightening it or changing 
the burden of proof.58 
 
 52 Id.  The reference to “prevailing confusion” apparently refers to the consistent, albeit 
in the Federal Circuit’s view incorrect, holdings of every other circuit court of appeals.  
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.b. 
 53 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359 (noting that Judge Rich was one of the 
authors of the Patent Act of 1952, which codified the presumption of validity at 35 
U.S.C. § 282). 
 54 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1360.  In this section of the opinion, the court expressly concedes that it is 
interpreting the statutory presumption of validity and the statutory language governing 
which party has the burden of proof as “different expressions of the same thing.” Id.  
Interpreting separate statutory language to mean the same thing, of course, contradicts a 
fundamental tenet of statutory construction. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 
174 (2001) (noting the duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute). 
 58 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1360. 
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Notably, the court’s discussion of whether the burden of 
persuasion is reduced when an attacker relies upon prior art not 
considered by the USPTO appears to be dicta in light of the 
challenged jury instruction, which explained that the burden of 
proof shifts.59  Furthermore, this dicta, while full of conclusions, is 
not supported by any statutory, logical, or policy-based analysis.  
Instead, the court appears to be relying solely on a Supreme Court 
case, Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.,60 that 
did not even address the situation in which an attacker relies upon 
prior art not considered by the USPTO, let alone prior art that is 
more relevant than prior art considered by the USPTO.61  
Moreover, the court’s discussion of whether the burden of 
persuasion is reduced when an attacker relies upon prior art not 
considered by the USPTO altogether fails to address the situation 
in which that prior art is more relevant than the prior art considered 
by the USPTO.  Thus, the court avoided this latter situation and 
therefore offered no statutory, logical, or policy-based justification 
to apply a clear and convincing burden of proof in this situation 
either. 
f) Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co. 
The Federal Circuit reached the question of whether the burden 
of proof can be reduced (but not shifted) based on a comparison of 
the relevance of prior art asserted in litigation and the relevance of 
prior art considered by the USPTO in Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. 
A. Stucki Co.62  The court, in yet another opinion by Chief Judge 
Markey, held that the introduction of more pertinent prior art than 
that considered by the patent examiner does not entitle the party 
asserting invalidity to a jury instruction that its burden can be met 
by a preponderance of the evidence.63  In language reminiscent of 
many of the cases discussed above, the court maintained that the 
presumption of validity is neither weakened nor destroyed where 
 
 59 See id.  
 60 293 U.S. 1 (1934). 
 61 See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1360 (citing Radio Corp., 293 U.S. 
at 7–8).   
 62 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 63 Id. 
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prior art more pertinent than that considered by the USPTO is 
introduced.64  Instead, the court explained, the party challenging 
validity is more likely to carry its burden of proving facts clearly 
and convincingly under those circumstances.65 
Although this was the first opinion by the Federal Circuit 
addressing whether the burden on the alleged infringer of proving 
invalidity should be less than clear and convincing evidence when 
the prior art is more relevant than prior art considered by the 
USPTO, the court offered no statutory, logical, or policy-based 
justification for its conclusion that the clear and convincing burden 
applies.66  Instead, the court relied upon its precedent that traces its 
roots to the cases addressed above, none of which addressed this 
precise situation and several of which included only dicta on 
related circumstances. 
2. Modern Treatment of the Standard 
Since this series of opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in its 
formative years, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected the 
contention that the presumption of validity is weakened or 
destroyed if there is prior art that is more pertinent than the art 
called to the attention of the USPTO.67  Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  The court similarly held that the fact that the best mode requirement was not 
considered by the examiner did not entitle the party challenging validity to a 
preponderance burden of proof. Id. 
 66 The Federal Circuit subsequently addressed this same issue in Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 
Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d on 
other grounds, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  In Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., an accused infringer argued 
that the jury should have been told that the presumption of validity may be weakened or 
destroyed when prior art more pertinent than that considered by the patent examiner is 
presented at trial, and that because prior art presented at trial was more pertinent than the 
prior art before the patent examiner that the jury should have been instructed that the 
accused infringer only had to carry its burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id.  The court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Baldwin, rejected these 
arguments, holding that the introduction of prior art not considered by the USPTO does 
not change the burden of proof or the requirement that evidence establish the 
presumption-defeating facts clearly and convincingly. Id.  Again, however, the court 
failed to articulate any statutory, logical, or policy-based justification for its holding.   
 67 See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1497–98 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986); Lear-Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 885–86 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
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has maintained the position that invalidity must always be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence regardless of any particular 
circumstances.68  Thus, even when an invalidity defense is based 
on prior art not considered by the USPTO during a patent’s 
prosecution, and even if that prior art is more relevant than the 
prior art considered by the USPTO, the Federal Circuit still 
requires that invalidity be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.69  In short, because the Federal Circuit has held that the 
presumption of validity “is never . . . destroyed, or even weakened, 
regardless of what facts are of record,”70 it has held that the clear 
and convincing burden of proof always applies. 
One of the Federal Circuit’s most recent cases addressing 
whether the clear and convincing burden of proof applies in every 
circumstance is z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.71  There, 
the court considered a challenge to a district court’s refusal to 
 
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1459 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 68 See, e.g., Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the presumption of validity does not dissolve and the burden of proof does 
not change during a trial); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 
1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the clear and convincing burden of proof is 
“unvarying” and does not vary depending on the circumstances), overruled on other 
grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (en banc); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1574–75 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the presumption of validity “is never . . . destroyed, or even 
weakened, regardless of what facts are of record”); see also PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the fact that prior art was 
never before the USPTO does not change the presumption of validity); z4 Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a jury instruction 
was erroneous because it might lead the jury to believe that the burden of proof is less 
than clear and convincing when prior art was not considered by the USPTO).  In a recent 
Federal Circuit case, the court also noted that the ultimate burden of persuasion “never 
shifts” from the party asserting invalidity to the patent owner, however much the burden 
of going forward may jump from one party to another. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. 
Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 131 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).  Unlike the 
burden of proof governing invalidity, however, the ultimate burden of persuasion is 
expressly recited in 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), and the statute itself indicates that the 
ultimate burden of persuasion does not shift from one party to another. 
 69 See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
 70 ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc., 732 F.2d at 1574–75. 
 71 507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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instruct a jury that the burden of proof on invalidity “is more easily 
carried when the [prior art] references on which the assertion is 
based were not directly considered by the examiner during 
prosecution.”72 
The court began its analysis by drawing a distinction between 
the proposed instruction’s use of the word “is” and the court’s 
view that its precedent indicates only that a party “may” more 
easily meet the clear and convincing evidence burden when the 
prior art was not before the examiner.73  In the end, the court 
rejected the instruction for two additional reasons.  First, the court 
relied upon the fact that none of its earlier cases required such an 
instruction.74  Second, in the court’s view, the instruction might 
lead the jury to believe that the burden of proof is less than clear 
and convincing when prior art was not considered by the 
USPTO.75 
The court did not expressly focus on the fact that the 
instruction was not limited to prior art that is more pertinent than 
the prior art considered by the examiner, but this concept may in 
part explain the basis for the court’s opinion.  By emphasizing that 
its precedent recognizes that a party more easily meets the clear 
and convincing evidentiary burden in only some circumstances, the 
court may have been making a veiled reference to the circumstance 
in which the prior art used in litigation is more relevant than the 
prior art used in prosecution. 
Regardless, the court’s analysis of the issue before it—which 
did not distinguish between more relevant and less relevant prior 
art—while perhaps reaching the correct result, is not persuasive.  
Reliance on the fact that no case had ever required this particular 
jury instruction, of course, is no justification for not allowing it.76  
 
 72 Id. at 1354. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1354–55. 
 76 While not addressing the exact same issue, consider two earlier Federal Circuit 
cases.  In the first, Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the 
Federal Circuit held as erroneous a jury instruction that the burden of proving invalidity 
is clear and convincing unless the jury finds that the prior art cited in the litigation is 
more pertinent than the prior art cited to the USPTO, in which case the burden is a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 741.  According to the court, the “burden is 
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And the court’s reliance on possible confusion over the applicable 
burden of proof based on this instruction actually highlights the 
tension between the recognition that when prior art has not been 
considered by the USPTO it should be easier to prove invalidity 
and the clear and convincing burden of proof itself.  While the 
court resolved this tension in favor of the clear and convincing 
burden of proof, it failed to offer any justification for the 
requirement of this stringent a burden in the situation where prior 
art has not been considered by the USPTO, let alone where more 
relevant prior art is asserted in litigation than has been considered 
by the USPTO.  Indeed, the court failed even to consider the fact 
that almost every opinion discussed above addressing the invalidity 
standard indicates that the burden of persuasion is more easily met 
when the alleged infringer relies upon prior art that is more 
pertinent than the prior art considered by the USPTO.77 
 
permanent and does not change.” Id.  In the second, Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 
F.3d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993), however, the Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to the 
following jury instruction: 
Because the deference to be given the [USPTO]’s determination is 
related to the evidence it had before it, you should consider the 
evidence presented to the [USPTO] during the reissue application 
process, compare it with the evidence you have heard in this case, 
and then determine what weight to give the [USPTO]’s 
determinations.  
Id. at 1563–64.  Significantly, the instruction in Mendenhall highlights that the proper 
deference due the USPTO depends upon a comparison of the evidence the USPTO had 
before it during prosecution and the evidence asserted in litigation.  The court concluded 
that this instruction concerns administrative correctness, does not undercut the 
presumption of validity, is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, and, ultimately, was 
not erroneous. Id.  While the court in Mendenhall did not set forth a rule that this 
instruction must be used in every case, it is significant that the court did not find this 
instruction to be erroneous.  Indeed, the logic behind this instruction is consistent with the 
application of a lesser burden of proof for unconsidered, material prior art, even though 
the court rejected this exact proposition in Medtronic.  The Federal Circuit did not refer 
to Medtronic or Mendenhall in its opinion in z4 Techs., Inc. 
 77 See R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983); SSIH Equip. 
S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Stratoflex, Inc. v. 
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
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B. The Rationale: The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
Presumably Considers the Most Relevant Prior Art 
The Federal Circuit relies on the statutory presumption of 
validity expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 282 as justification for requiring 
clear and convincing evidence of invalidity in every 
circumstance.78  This presumption recognizes the deference that is 
due to a qualified government agency presumed to have performed 
its job correctly.79  In this context, for example, the court presumes 
that examiners have some expertise in interpreting the prior art and 
are familiar with the level of skill in the art.80 
For this rationale to justify a rule that the clear and convincing 
burden of proof applies in every circumstance, however, the court 
must presume that examiners search, find, and consider the most 
relevant prior art, compare the claims of patent applications with 
the most relevant prior art, and allow only valid claims to issue as 
patents over the most relevant prior art.81  In other words, the only 
reasonable rationale for the Federal Circuit’s strict standard of 
requiring clear and convincing evidence in every situation is that 
the USPTO is presumed to have considered the most relevant prior 
art and still allowed the patent application to issue as a patent. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STANDARD FOR 
PROVING INVALIDITY 
There are several problems associated with requiring clear and 
convincing evidence to prove invalidity in all instances.  As a 
logical matter, the only rationale for applying a clear and 
 
 78 See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
 79 Id. at 1359. 
 80 Id.; see also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“The ‘presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 carries with it a presumption that 
the Examiner did his duty and knew what claims he was allowing.’” (quoting Intervet 
Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1989))). 
 81 Cf. Wm. Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of 
Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 951 (1942) (explaining that the reasoning 
behind awarding patents—that the patent does not take from the public anything that it 
had before the invention, while its profitability often bears a reasonable relation to the 
public benefit from the invention—“is wholly valid only if the [USPTO] is aware of all 
existing and past industrial practices”). 
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convincing burden of proof in every instance fails to justify the 
scope of the Federal Circuit’s application of that standard.  As a 
factual matter, the standard is based on incorrect assumptions.  In 
terms of incentives, the standard fails to provide proper incentives 
to patent owners to disclose prior art to the USPTO.  And in terms 
of results, the standard negatively affects patent quality, unjustly 
rewards patent applicants, and creates unnecessary transaction 
costs. 
A. The Standard and the Rationale Are Not Coextensive 
As a logical matter, the only rationale for applying a clear and 
convincing burden of proof in every instance—that the USPTO 
always considers the most relevant prior art—fails to justify 
applying this burden of proof when the prior art presented in 
litigation is more relevant than the prior art considered by the 
USPTO.  In other words, the rationale for the Federal Circuit’s 
standard and the standard itself are not coextensive.  When the 
presumption that the USPTO has considered the most relevant 
prior art is proven incorrect, why should the Federal Circuit’s 
application of that presumption—the clear and convincing burden 
of proof—continue to apply?  As a logical matter, it should not.  
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has failed to explain any logical 
rationale behind enforcing the clear and convincing burden of 
proof when the presumption that the USPTO considered the most 
relevant prior art is proven false. 
B. The Standard Is Based on Incorrect Assumptions 
As a factual matter, the Federal Circuit’s standard is based on 
incorrect assumptions.  The USPTO likely does not always—or 
even usually—find and consider the most relevant prior art.  There 
are several bases for this conclusion: information asymmetry 
between patent applicants and the USPTO, the lack of incentives 
for examiners to find the most relevant prior art, the USPTO’s 
limited resources, and the fact that patent prosecution largely is an 
ex parte procedure that excludes public participation. 
Information asymmetry exists between patent applicants and 
the USPTO.  Inventors typically know more about their own field 
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of technology than do the examiners at the USPTO.82  Inventors 
normally have better information concerning the date of their 
invention, any barring activities, and at least some of the prior art, 
particularly prior products and industry publications.  Unless the 
inventors voluntarily provide the USPTO with this information or 
such information is obtained by performing searches on public 
information, examiners likely do not consider the most relevant 
information concerning patentability.  By contrast, in litigation the 
alleged infringer has all of the tools of discovery to obtain this 
information; its disclosure does not depend on the good faith of 
patent applicants. 
Examiners at the USPTO lack incentives to find the most 
relevant prior art.  Particularly as compared to alleged infringers 
that wish to avoid paying damages or royalties to the patent owner 
or being enjoined from practicing the patented technology, 
examiners at the USPTO have little externally-imposed incentive 
to find the most relevant prior art.83  In light of the disparity 
between the incentives on alleged infringers and examiners, it is 
more likely that alleged infringers find the most relevant prior art. 
The USPTO has limited resources.  Patent examiners spend an 
extremely short amount of time searching for prior art.84  And they 
do not necessarily have the best access to prior art databases.85  In 
 
 82 See Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that 
“the patent practice includes recognition that the inventor usually knows more about the 
field than does the ‘expert’ patent examiner”). 
 83 See Turzillo v. P. & Z. Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he 
proceeding before the [USPTO] . . . is dependent upon examination by an official . . . 
who does not have the extra spark of an economic incentive to avoid the tribute or other 
restraint that may be exacted by a patentee.”). 
 84 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 5, at 5 (2003) (indicating that “panelists 
varied in their estimates of the amount of time available to examine an application from 
start to finish, but all indicated that it was very short” and that the examination included 
reading and understanding the application, searching for prior art, evaluating 
patentability, communicating with the applicant, working out necessary revisions, and 
reaching and writing up conclusions). 
 85 In his dissent in Diamond v. Diehr, Justice Stevens noted that the President’s 
Commission on the Patent System recommended against patent protection for computer 
programs at least in part because of the lack of requisite search files. Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175, 218 n.45 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Without the ability to search the 
prior art, the Commission concluded that the patenting of computer programs would be 
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litigation, on the other hand, alleged infringers often will go to the 
ends of the earth—sometimes literally—to find prior art due to the 
relatively strong incentive to find the most relevant prior art and 
relatively weak constraints in terms of dollars and time.  
Comparing the resources available to patent examiners and alleged 
infringers suggests, again, that alleged infringers are more likely to 
find the most relevant prior art. 
Patent prosecution mostly is an ex parte procedure that 
excludes public participation.86  As a result, the public remains 
largely unable to identify and disclose prior art to the USPTO.87  In 
litigation, by contrast, there are no restrictions on the public’s 
ability to identify and submit prior art to alleged infringers for 
potential use.  And even if third parties do not voluntarily assist 
accused infringers to find prior art, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide litigation counsel with subpoena power to 
compel third parties to produce documents and provide testimony 
regarding prior art.88  Thus, the ability of alleged infringers to 
utilize the public to search for and find prior art provides alleged 
infringers with an advantage over the USPTO. 
In light of all of these factors, and particularly when compared 
to alleged infringers embroiled in litigation, the USPTO is less 
likely to find and consider the most relevant prior art. 
C. The Standard Creates Improper Incentives 
In terms of incentives, applying the clear and convincing 
burden of proof regardless of whether the USPTO actually 
considered the most relevant prior art discourages patent applicants 
from investigating prior art, and therefore from potentially finding 
 
tantamount to mere registration and “the presumption of validity would be all but 
nonexistent.” Id. 
 86 Inter partes reexamination is one exception to the rule. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 
311–18 (2006). 
 87 An exception is the ability of third parties, within the first two years after the 
publication of a patent application, to submit to the USPTO prior art in the form of 
patents and printed publications. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2008).  These submissions, however, 
“shall not include any explanation of the patents or publications, or any other 
information” such as prior art in the form of prior sales of products. Id.  Moreover, these 
submissions are “limited to ten total patents or publications.” Id. 
 88 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
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and disclosing the most relevant prior art to the USPTO.  During 
prosecution at the USPTO, the burden of proving invalidity is by a 
preponderance of the evidence.89  All else being equal, a rational 
patent applicant who desires patent protection would prefer to have 
the invalidity of his or her claims decided, not under the 
preponderance burden of proof, but under the more stringent clear 
and convincing burden of proof.  But if the patent applicant learns 
about relevant prior art, the inequitable conduct defense90—and the 
specter of its remedy of unenforceability and potential attorneys’ 
fees91—provides an overwhelming incentive for the patent 
applicant to disclose this relevant prior art to the USPTO.  A 
rational patent applicant, therefore, may altogether avoid learning 
about potentially relevant prior art, for example by not searching 
for prior art until after a patent application issues as a patent.92  By 
doing so, the patent applicant may avoid both the preponderance 
burden of proof for invalidity and the remedies of the inequitable 
conduct defense.  Thus, applying the clear and convincing burden 
without regard to whether the most relevant prior art has been 
considered by the USPTO creates a perverse incentive for patent 
applicants not to find and disclose relevant prior art to the USPTO. 
The public, however, would benefit if the patent owner would 
search for prior art and disclose the most relevant prior art to the 
USPTO.  Indeed, this behavior would fortify the presumption upon 
 
 89 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 90 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (“Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee breaches his or her ‘duty of candor, 
good faith, and honesty’ to the [US]PTO.” (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 
1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995))). 
 91 Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 285 (2006)). The remedy for a finding of inequitable conduct 
with respect to one or more claims of a patent application is unenforceability of the entire 
patent. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (relevant portion en banc).  In addition, related patents also may be held 
unenforceable. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1227, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 92 Generally speaking, there is not a requirement that patent applicants search for prior 
art. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2006) (listing the requirements for a non-provisional patent 
application).  One exception is when a patent applicant desires to accelerate prosecution 
of an application. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 708.02 (8th ed. 2001, Jul. 2008 rev.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm. 
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which the clear and convincing burden of proof is based.  In short, 
the Federal Circuit’s standard is self-defeating—the standard itself 
undermines the very presumption on which it relies: that the 
USPTO considered the most relevant prior art.93 
D. Poor Patent Quality, Unjust Rewards, and Unnecessary Costs 
In terms of results, the Federal Circuit’s standard negatively 
affects patent quality, unjustly rewards patent applicants, and 
creates unnecessary transaction costs.  The primary effect of the 
incentive structure discussed above—encouraging patent 
applicants not to search for and disclose prior art to the USPTO—
is a reduction in the quality of patents in terms of their validity.  To 
the extent that the USPTO does not consider the most relevant 
prior art before allowing patent applications to issue as patents, the 
validity of the issued patents is undetermined.  Indeed, the perverse 
incentive created by the application of the clear and convincing 
burden of proof at all times likely results in the awarding of at least 
some, and perhaps many, patents to applicants that would not 
otherwise obtain protection for their disclosure. 
In this situation, the quid pro quo at the very heart of the patent 
system is turned on its head.  The patent applicant discloses 
nothing new or nonobvious but nevertheless receives a reward for 
his or her disclosure.94  The patent owner may charge a premium 
for a product or service and collect monopoly profits despite his or 
her failure to provide beneficial disclosure to the public.  In other 
words, patent applicants are unjustly rewarded, and the 
constitutional purpose of patents—to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts95—is thwarted. 
This unjust award of a patent comes at a significant cost.  To 
the extent that the patent owner is able to collect monopoly profits, 
these profits are at the public’s expense.  In addition, competitors 
 
 93 One proposal that would address this misalignment is to “grant a presumption of 
validity” only when prior art is disclosed to the USPTO.  See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and 
Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 770–76 (2002).  In 
the context of this proposal, the elimination of the grant of a presumption of validity 
involves lowering the burden of proof below clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 776. 
 94 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b). 
 95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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may be required to raise prices on their own products or services to 
offset the cost of negotiating license agreements or litigation with 
the patent owner.  Litigation of ultimately invalid patents may be 
required, costing significant sums of money to the parties as well 
as the public in terms of the costs of the judicial process.96  
Moreover, to the extent that the standard for proving invalidity in 
litigation is too strict, a patent that might never have been issued 
by the USPTO may ultimately survive a challenge to its validity.  
In short, the anticompetitive costs of a patent may be unleashed on 
the public, either temporarily or “permanently,”97 when those costs 
could have been prevented by the USPTO had it made a more fully 
informed decision regarding the patentability of the patent 
application in the first instance. 
III. REPLACING THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING BURDEN WITH A 
PREPONDERANCE BURDEN FOR UNCONSIDERED,                     
MATERIAL PRIOR ART 
To correct for the significant problems associated with the 
Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity—including its 
logical shortcomings, incorrect assumptions, perverse incentives, 
negative effects on patent quality, unjust rewards, and unnecessary 
transaction costs—that standard, which requires clear and 
convincing evidence of invalidity in every circumstance, should be 
replaced with a preponderance burden of proof when the USPTO 
did not consider material prior art. 
 
 96 In 2009, the median total cost to the parties of a patent infringement lawsuit with 
between $1 million and $25 million at risk was $2.5 million. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 
2009 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009). This cost, while high, does not count 
the expenses borne by juries and courts. Id. 
 97 The “temporary” effects of a patent in this situation refers to the time period 
between which the USPTO issues the patent and the patent is finally invalidated in court.  
The “permanent” effects of a patent in this situation refers to the time period between 
which the USPTO issues the patent and the patent expires at the conclusion of its the 
statutory term—now twenty years from the date on which the patent application was filed 
in the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
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A. The Concept: A Preponderance Burden for Unconsidered, 
Material Prior Art 
The Federal Circuit’s standard, which requires clear and 
convincing evidence to prove invalidity in every circumstance, 
should be replaced with a standard that reflects whether the 
USPTO actually considered the most relevant prior art at the time 
the patent was issued.  If an alleged infringer asserts unconsidered 
and material prior art in litigation, the preponderance burden of 
proof should apply to the question of invalidity.  Otherwise, the 
clear and convincing burden of proof should apply. 
1. “Unconsidered” Prior Art 
Under this proposal, a first threshold determination would be 
whether the prior art asserted in litigation has been considered by 
the USPTO.  Only if the prior art was not considered by the 
USPTO would the preponderance burden of proof potentially 
apply.  Consideration of prior art by the USPTO could be 
determined, in the first instance, by reference to the face of the 
patent at issue.  The “References Cited” section of every patent 
will identify prior art considered by the USPTO.98  The 
prosecution history, however, also should be consulted to 
determine whether the USPTO considered additional prior art 
references that, due to an error, were omitted from the face of the 
patent. 
The view that the only references considered by the USPTO 
are those cited on the face of patents was criticized in Solder 
Removal Co.  There, the court noted that the USPTO’s failure to 
cite particular prior art does not necessarily mean that that prior art 
was not considered by the examiner because the examiner may 
have considered it and determined that it was unworthy of 
citation.99  The court did not cite any support for this proposition.  
 
 98 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1302.12 (8th ed. 2001, Jul. 2008 rev.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.  The references listed on the face of the issued patent 
include references cited by the patent applicant in Information Disclosure Statements and 
references cited by the patent examiner on form PTO-892. Id. 
 99 Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 
1978). 
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Moreover, even if the failure to cite particular prior art does not 
necessarily mean that that prior art was not considered by the 
examiner, it seems more likely than not that in most situations 
when an examiner does not cite particular prior art, the failure to 
cite that prior art means that that it was not considered by the 
examiner.  Thus, in terms of setting a default rule, it makes more 
sense to presume that prior art references not cited on the face of a 
patent were not considered by the USPTO.  Indeed, in Connell, the 
Federal Circuit conceded that there is virtually always pertinent 
and relevant prior art not considered by the USPTO.100  A default 
rule should not presume the opposite.101 
2. “Material” Prior Art 
If the prior art asserted in litigation has not been considered by 
the USPTO, a second threshold determination would be made: 
whether the unconsidered prior art is material to patentability.102  
This materiality analysis should include two prongs.  First, a 
determination should be made concerning whether the prior art is 
relevant to the claimed invention.  For example, information 
should be considered material “where there is a substantial 
 
 100 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 101 Others have proposed an alternative reform that would modify the burden of proving 
invalidity based on the extent to which the USPTO has considered any particular prior 
art. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–51 (2007) (proposing a preponderance burden of proof 
for traditional USPTO consideration of prior art and a clear and convincing burden of 
proof for enhanced USPTO consideration of prior art).  That proposal would require the 
implementation of new USPTO procedures to obtain an enhanced burden of proof, 
regardless of prior consideration of prior art by the USPTO. Id.  The reform proposed 
here would not require implementation of any new USPTO procedures. 
 102 Materiality is a concept central to the issue of inequitable conduct, and in the context 
of inequitable conduct it can be measured under various standards:  (1) a “subjective but 
for” standard; (2) an “objective but for” standard; (3) a “but it may have” standard; (4) 
the reasonable examiner standard; and (5) the standard currently set by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.  
Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
Some of these standards are more strict than others.  In the context of gauging the 
relevance of prior art for purposes of setting the invalidity standard, the relevant issues 
are whether the prior art is relevant and non-cumulative, as discussed below.  And while 
any of these standards could be adopted for purposes of the invalidity analysis, note that 
the reasonable examiner standard is the least difficult to satisfy, while the standard 
currently set by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 already expressly includes the concept of non-
cumulativeness. 
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likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important 
in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a 
patent.”103  Only if the prior art asserted in litigation is 
“important,” or relevant, would the preponderance burden of proof 
potentially apply. 
Second, an analysis should be made concerning whether the 
prior art is cumulative to prior art already considered by the 
USPTO.  “Cumulativeness” refers to the situation where 
information teaches no more than what a reasonable examiner 
would consider to be taught by prior art already before the 
USPTO.104  Non-cumulativeness, then, refers to the situation 
where information teaches more than what a reasonable examiner 
would consider to be taught by prior art already before the USPTO.  
Only if the prior art asserted in litigation is non-cumulative should 
the preponderance burden of proof potentially apply. 
Applying these concepts, if prior art asserted in litigation (1) 
was not considered by the USPTO and is both (2)(a) relevant to the 
claimed invention and (2)(b) non-cumulative, then the 
preponderance burden of proof should apply to the question of 
invalidity.  On the other hand, if prior art asserted in litigation (1) 
was considered by the USPTO or is either (2)(a) not relevant to the 
claimed invention or (2)(b) cumulative, then the clear and 
convincing burden of proof should apply to the question of 
invalidity.  Stated more concisely, this proposal would replace the 
clear and convincing burden of proof with a preponderance burden 
of proof when the USPTO did not consider material prior art.105 
 
 103 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991).  This is the reasonable examiner standard of materiality. 
 104 University of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 105 Some have advocated this same position—that the proper evidentiary burden is 
preponderance of the evidence when material evidence was not considered by the 
USPTO. See, e.g., Charles E. Phipps, The Presumption of Administrative Correctness: 
The Proper Basis for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 
143, 162 (2000).  Others, however, have proposed applying the preponderance burden of 
proof when prior art asserted in litigation raises a “substantial new question of 
patentability.” See, e.g., Clarence J. Fleming, Should the Clear & Convincing Evidence 
Standard for Rebutting the Presumption of Validity Apply when the Challenger Raises a 
Substantial New Question of Patentability?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 146, 
149 (1998).  The “substantial new question of patentability” test—used by the USPTO to 
determine whether to grant a request for reexamination pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 304—has 
proven unworkable in practice.  The USPTO almost always finds a “substantial new 
C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2011  10:20 PM 
322 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:293 
3. Who Determines Which Burden of Proof Applies? 
There are two possible answers to the question of who would 
determine which burden of proof to apply: the jury or the trial 
judge.  There are also two possible approaches to determining 
whether the jury or the trial judge will make this decision. 
One approach would allow the factfinder on the ultimate 
invalidity issue to determine which burden of proof to apply.  
Anticipation is a question of fact.106  Thus, a jury might be 
provided instructions on how to determine whether to apply the 
clear and convincing burden of proof or the preponderance burden 
of proof.107  Obviousness, however, is a question of law based on 
underlying questions of fact.108  Sometimes juries are called upon 
to answer the ultimate question of whether a patent claim is 
obvious, and other times juries are only given special 
interrogatories on the underlying factual questions with the trial 
 
question of patentability.” See, e.g., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX 
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—MARCH 31, 2010, available at http:// 
reexamcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010-03-31-Ex-Parte.pdf (indicating that 
the USPTO grants requests for ex parte reexamination more than 90% of the time).  The 
problem with the “substantial new question of patentability” test may be that it does not 
expressly take into account whether new prior art is cumulative compared to prior art 
already resolved by the USPTO.  
 106 Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 107 One practitioner, citing Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), has advocated the opposite position: omitting any jury instruction regarding the 
presumption of validity and limiting the court’s instruction to the admonition that the 
alleged infringer has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.  
David C. Bohrer, Knocking the Eagle Off the Patent Owner’s Shoulder: Chiron Holds 
that Jurors Don’t Have to be Told that a Patent Is Presumed Valid, 21 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 259, 284–85 (2004).  This position, however, is based on 
an unsupported assumption that, when the jury is left in the dark regarding the 
presumption of validity, the jury “will have little or no understanding of how much 
evidence is required” to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, and therefore that the 
alleged infringer will find it “much easier to convince the jury” to invalidate patents. Id.  
Moreover, it is based on a questionable belief that the jury will reject the judge’s 
instruction on the burden of proof and set a lower hurdle for the alleged infringer:  “If the 
jury does not understand the reasons for shifting burdens and higher standards, the 
likelihood is that the jury would set the hurdle much lower than they would if they knew 
the full story.” Id. at 285.  Instructing the jury on “the full story”—and in particular 
instructing the jury to apply a preponderance burden of proof when prior art has not been 
considered by the USPTO—quite obviously would make it much more likely that a jury 
actually applies this lower hurdle to the question of invalidity when appropriate.  
 108 Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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judge deciding in the first instance the ultimate question of whether 
a patent claim is obvious.109  In the former circumstance, the 
jury—again through the use of jury instructions—might be tasked 
with determining which burden of proof to apply.110  In the latter 
circumstance, the trial judge would take on this task. 
An alternative approach would allow the trial judge to 
determine which burden of proof the ultimate factfinder should 
apply.  The trial judge always would decide the appropriate burden 
of proof under this alternative implementation and instruct the jury 
to apply that burden of proof on anticipation and, to the extent the 
issue is put to the jury, obviousness. 
B. The Support 
There is logical and precedential support for the application of 
a preponderance burden of proof when the USPTO does not 
consider material prior art.  This proposal would make the standard 
and its appropriate rationale coextensive, recognize the realities of 
examination of patent applications by the USPTO, and reflect the 
precedent of the Supreme Court and every other circuit court of 
appeals. 
 
 109 See, e.g., The National Jury Instruction Project, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§§ 5.9–10 (2009), available at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org (providing 
separate model jury instructions for instances in which the jury will rule upon the 
ultimate issue of obviousness and instances in which the jury will answer only special 
interrogatories regarding the underlying factual issues). 
 110 For example, a jury instruction adopting this proposed reform might recite: 
If you find that prior art asserted in this case was not considered by 
the USPTO, is relevant to the claimed invention, and is not 
cumulative, then you should apply the preponderance burden of proof 
to the question of invalidity.  On the other hand, if you find that prior 
art asserted in this case was considered by the USPTO or is not 
relevant to the claimed invention or is cumulative, then you should 
apply the clear and convincing burden of proof to the question of 
invalidity.  Prior art is cumulative where that prior art teaches no 
more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to be taught 
by prior art already considered by the USPTO. 
The complexity of this jury instruction is a factor favoring an implementation in which 
the trial judge selects the appropriate burden of proof. 
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1. Making the Standard and Its Rationale Coextensive 
The rationale behind the decision of which burden of proof to 
apply to the issue of invalidity is twofold: (1) that the USPTO 
correctly rules upon evidence in front of it and (2) that a patent 
applicant is entitled to a patent only if the applicant’s claims 
cannot be proven invalid in the first instance by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Applying the clear and convincing burden of 
proof—when the USPTO has already considered the same prior art 
relied upon in litigation or prior art just as relevant as the prior art 
relied upon in litigation—would reflect the belief that the USPTO, 
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, correctly 
ruled upon the validity of the patent application in light of the 
evidence in front of it.  On the other hand, applying the 
preponderance burden of proof—when the USPTO has not already 
considered prior art relied upon in litigation and that prior art is 
more relevant than the prior art the USPTO did consider—would 
reflect the belief that a patent applicant is entitled to a patent in the 
first instance only if invalidity of the applicant’s claims cannot be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence.  In short, this proposal 
would make the standard and its appropriate rationale coextensive. 
The first part of the rationale, that the USPTO correctly rules 
upon the validity of the patent application in light of the evidence 
in front of it, is articulated in Federal Circuit cases.  In American 
Hoist & Derrick Co., for example, the court focused on the 
deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed 
to have properly done its job, but conceded that when an attacker 
relies on prior art or other evidence not already considered by the 
USPTO, there is no reason for deference.111  While this analysis 
alone does not support the Federal Circuit’s invalidity standard—
applying the clear and convincing burden of proof in every 
instance, regardless of whether the attacker relies on better prior art 
than the prior art considered by the USPTO—this analysis supports 
applying the clear and convincing burden of proof when the 
USPTO has already considered the same prior art relied upon in 
litigation or prior art just as relevant as the prior art relied upon in 
 
 111 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
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litigation.112  Built into this first part of the rationale, of course, is 
the understanding that the USPTO does not always consider the 
most relevant, and certainly not all of the, prior art.113 
The second part of the rationale, that a patent applicant is 
entitled to a patent only if the applicant’s claims cannot be proven 
invalid in the first instance by a preponderance of the evidence, 
also is supported by Federal Circuit cases.  The Federal Circuit has 
held that, during prosecution, the USPTO must prove invalidity by 
a preponderance of the evidence.114  Thus, when patent 
applications are reviewed in the first instance, the burden for 
proving that the statutory requirements of patentability are not met 
is a preponderance of the evidence.115  Moreover, in the absence of 
a statutory presumption of validity, the Federal Circuit would 
apply a preponderance burden of proof to invalidity issues raised in 
litigation.116 
The Federal Circuit, however, has interpreted the statutory 
presumption of validity as mandating that the clear and convincing 
burden of proof applies regardless of any other consideration.117  
 
 112 For this rationale to support the Federal Circuit’s standard, a false presumption must 
be made that the USPTO considers the most relevant prior art.  See discussion supra Part 
II.B. 
 113 See Woodward, supra note 81, at 959 (highlighting problems associated with the 
“failure to realize fully that the American patent system . . . leaves to private litigation the 
resolution of vital matters of fact that rarely appear in commensurate fullness in [USPTO] 
proceedings—if indeed they are involved there at all—and that consequently the decision 
on the issue of patent validity in an infringement suit is not simply judicial review of 
administrative findings”). 
 114 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 115 Id. 
 116 The Federal Circuit has indicated that invalidity for lack of written description is 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence due to the lack of a statutory presumption 
with respect to patent applications. See Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 
1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  Similarly, the court has held that the presumption of validity does not 
apply to patents involved in interference proceedings, resulting in the application of 
burden of proof of a preponderance of the evidence, unless it is a priority contest between 
an issued patent and an application that was filed after the issuance of the patent.  Apotex 
U.S., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1037 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bruning v. Hirose, 
161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1193–94 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
 117 See Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the presumption of validity does not dissolve and the burden of proof does not 
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To the extent that the presumption of validity even addresses the 
appropriate burden of proof,118 the presumption of validity should 
be interpreted and understood to mean that, in the absence of clear 
proof to the contrary, the USPTO correctly rules upon evidence in 
front of it.  It should not be interpreted to mean, contrary to reality 
and in an irrebuttable fashion, that the USPTO always considers 
the most relevant prior art.  As discussed below, interpreting the 
presumption of validity to mean that, in the absence of clear proof 
to the contrary, the USPTO correctly rules upon evidence in front 
of it, is more consistent with reality, Supreme Court precedent, and 
the law of every other circuit court of appeals. 
2. Recognizing the Realities of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office Examination 
Adoption of a standard that applies the preponderance burden 
of proof on the issue of invalidity when a determination has been 
made that the USPTO did not consider the most relevant prior art 
would recognize the realities of the examination of patent 
applications by the USPTO.  As discussed above, the USPTO 
likely does not always, or even usually, find and consider the most 
relevant prior art due to the information asymmetry between patent 
applicants and the USPTO, the lack of incentives for examiners to 
find the most relevant prior art, the USPTO’s limited resources, 
and the fact that patent prosecution largely is an ex parte procedure 
that excludes public participation.119  Because it is likely that 
litigation often involves an analysis of the patentability of patent 
claims based on evidence considered in the first instance, the law 
 
change during a trial); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 
1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the clear and convincing burden of proof is 
“unvarying” and does not change depending on the circumstances), overruled on other 
grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038–39 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 
1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the presumption of validity “is never . . . 
destroyed, or even weakened, regardless of what facts are of record”). 
 118 Again, note that some have argued that the presumption of validity simply puts the 
initial burden of coming forward with evidence on the issue of validity on the alleged 
infringer. See, e.g., B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement 
Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 380 (2008).  
 119 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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should allow the invalidity analysis to proceed under the 
preponderance burden of proof in that circumstance. 
3. Precedent 
The Federal Circuit appears to rely on two bases for its 
requirement that clear and convincing evidence be shown in every 
instance to prove invalidity: (1) Supreme Court precedent 
supposedly requiring this standard and (2) the statutory 
presumption of validity expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 282.120  Neither 
basis has merit.  The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the 
proper interpretation of the presumption of validity and the proper 
burden of proof when more relevant prior art is asserted in 
litigation than the prior art considered by the USPTO.121  
Furthermore, the “social disutility” analysis the Supreme Court 
uses to determine appropriate burdens of proof supports the 
application of the preponderance standard in this situation.  
Moreover, the other circuit courts that have interpreted the 
statutory presumption of validity effectively have concluded that it 
 
 120 See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (citing Radio Corp. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1934) 
(interpreting the statutory presumption of validity)). 
 121 Shortly before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in i4i 
Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 
3128 (Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 10-290).  This case may squarely address the issues raised in 
this Article, as shown by Microsoft’s petition for writ of certiorari: 
The Patent Act provides that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid” and 
that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim 
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 
282.  The Federal Circuit held below that Microsoft was required to 
prove its defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by “clear and 
convincing evidence,” even though the prior art on which the 
invalidity defense rests was not considered by the Patent and 
Trademark Office prior to the issuance of the asserted patent.  The 
question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding 
that Microsoft’s invalidity defense must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp. (No. 10-290), 2010 WL 
3413088, at *ii (Aug. 27, 2010).  As this Article explains, the Supreme Court should 
require consideration of not just whether the USPTO considered during the original 
prosecution the prior art raised in litigation, but also whether that prior art is material 
when compared to the prior art the USPTO did consider during prosecution.  When prior 
art was not considered and is material, then the preponderance burden, not the clear and 
convincing burden, should apply. 
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requires only a presumption that the USPTO correctly ruled upon 
the evidence in front of it—not that the USPTO considered the 
most relevant prior art or that it, illogically, correctly ruled upon 
evidence that it did not even consider.  Indeed, some of the other 
circuit courts have concluded that the preponderance burden of 
proof applies when more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation 
than the prior art considered by the USPTO. 
a) Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the proper 
interpretation of the presumption of validity or the proper burden 
of proof when more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation than 
the prior art considered by the USPTO.  Yet there is reason to 
believe that, if it did, it might adopt a preponderance standard in 
this situation. 
i. Supreme Court Opinions Prior to Radio Corp. v. Radio 
Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 
Prior to its decision in the oft-cited case of Radio Corp., the 
Supreme Court issued a multitude of opinions that addressed the 
presumption of validity.122  Significantly, those cases do not attach 
 
 122 See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 348 
(1924) (“The patent of the exclusive right against the public carries with it a presumption 
of its validity.  It is not conclusive but the presumption gives the grant substance and 
value.” (citation omitted)); Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 71 
(1885) (“In reaching this conclusion, we have allowed its due weight to the presumption 
in favor of the validity of the patent arising from the action of the patent-office in 
granting it . . . .”); Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 662 (1879) (“Where the patent in 
suit is introduced in evidence it affords a prima facie presumption that the invention is 
new and useful . . . .”); Roemer v. Simon, 95 U.S. 214, 215 (1877) (“Patentees or 
assignees in a suit for infringement, where the patent described in the bill of complaint is 
introduced in evidence, are presumed to be the original and first inventors of the 
described improvement; and, if they have proved the alleged infringement, the burden of 
proof is cast upon the respondents to show that the patent is invalid, unless the patent is 
materially defective in form.”); Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 
499 (1876) (“To sustain this position the defendant must overcome the presumption 
against him arising from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents . . . .”); Mitchell v. 
Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 390 (1873) (“Power to issue letters-patent is conferred 
upon the commissioner of patents, and inasmuch as such grants are executed by public 
authority and in pursuance of an act of Congress, the rule is that the patent, when 
introduced in evidence by the complaining party in a suit for infringement, affords a 
prima facie presumption that the patentee is the original and first inventor of what is 
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any particular burden of proving invalidity to this presumption of 
validity, nor do they address the question of whether the burden of 
proof changes when more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation 
than the prior art considered by the USPTO. 
One of the earliest of these cases is Philadelphia & Trenton 
Railroad Co. v. Stimpson.123  While the Court did not address the 
particular burden of proof required to prove that a patent is invalid, 
it did highlight that the presumption of validity is dependent upon 
whether the evidence was “laid before the officer”—that is, 
presented to the USPTO.  The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Story, explained that there is a presumption of compliance with the 
patent laws upon issuance of the patent itself.124  According to the 
Court, the fact that a public officer has granted a patent is prima 
facie evidence that the requirements of the patent laws have been 
met, and no other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or controvert 
the satisfaction of these requirements if the evidence was laid 
before the officer.125  In addition to deeming a patent on an 
invention to be prima facie evidence of compliance with the patent 
 
therein described and claimed as his invention.”); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 
Wall.) 516, 538–39 (1870) (“Power to grant letters patent is conferred by law upon the 
Commissioner of Patents, and when that power has been lawfully exercised, and a patent 
has been duly granted, it is of itself prima facie evidence that the patentee is the original 
and first inventor of that which is therein described, and secured to him as his invention. . 
. . [The] effect as evidence is to cast the burden of proof upon the respondents to show 
that the respective patentees are not the original and first inventors of the improvements 
embodied in the several letters patent . . . .”); Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
583, 596–97 (1868) (“[T]he rule of law is that the letters patent afford a prima facie 
presumption that the patentee is the original and first inventor of what is therein described 
as his improvement. . . . Application for a patent is required to be made to the 
commissioner appointed under authority of law, and inasmuch as that officer is 
empowered to decide upon the merits of the application, his decision in granting the 
patent is presumed to be correct.”); Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39 
U.S. (14 Pet.) 448, 459 (1840) (noting that “[p]atents for lands, equally with patents for 
inventions, have been deemed prima facie evidence that they were regularly granted”). 
 123 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840).   
 124 Id. at 458. 
 125 Id.  The Court would later reject the proposition that the decisions of the USPTO are 
conclusive and not open to examination in the courts. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 
347, 354–55 (1875).  Instead, the Court explained that “the allowance and issuance of a 
patent creates a prima facie right only” and “the validity of the patent is subject to an 
examination by the courts.” Id. 
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laws,126 the Court noted that, in light of the requirement that patent 
applicants provide an oath asserting that the inventor is the first 
inventor, courts in this country have deemed the patent’s issuance 
prima facie evidence that the inventor is in fact the first inventor.127 
Later, in Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp.,128 
the Supreme Court addressed the argument that a patent secured by 
false evidence is not entitled to the presumption of validity.129  The 
Court rejected this argument, but only because the false evidence 
did not form the basis for the granting of the patent, nor was it 
“essentially material” to the patent’s issuance.130  As a result, the 
Court concluded that the “presumption of validity furnished by the 
grant of the patent . . . would not seem to be destroyed.”131  In this 
way, the Court implied that the presumption of validity would be 
“destroyed” if false evidence was “essentially material” to the 
patent’s issuance.  While limited to the introduction of “essentially 
material” false evidence, the holding leaves open the possibility 
that the withholding of “essentially material” prior art similarly 
would “destroy” the presumption of validity.  Moreover, this 
holding indicates that the presumption of validity is not absolute 
but can be eliminated in certain circumstances. 
Thus, at least some Supreme Court opinions prior to Radio 
Corp. indicate that the presumption of validity depends upon 
whether prior art was presented to the USPTO and that the 
presumption of validity may be “destroyed” in some 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
 126 The Court compared patents for inventions with patents for lands, which when 
produced “under the great seal of the government” have been deemed prima facie 
evidence that they were regularly granted without any evidence that the law’s 
prerequisites were met. Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. Co., 39 U.S. at 459. 
 127 Id. But see Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 543 (1870) (explaining 
that, pursuant to a subsequent statute, “the fact of the granting of [a] reissued patent 
closed all inquiry into the existence of inadvertence, accident, or mistake”). 
128  276 U.S. 358 (1928). 
 129 Id. at 373–74. 
 130 Id. at 374. 
 131 Id.  
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ii. Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit has relied upon the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Radio Corp. as supporting the proposition that the 
burden of proof for invalidity does not change and requires clear 
and convincing evidence.132  It is important, therefore, to 
understand the context in which the Supreme Court considered the 
appropriate burden of proof to apply to the question of invalidity.  
That context reveals that the Supreme Court was not presented 
with the question of whether the burden of proof changes when 
more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation compared to the 
prior art considered by the USPTO.  To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court was addressing a case in which the same invalidity issue was 
being raised for the fourth time—and one of the prior cases 
resolved an interference proceeding between the parties at the 
USPTO. 
In Radio Corp., the Court faced a longstanding dispute 
between two inventors, Armstrong and De Forest, over which one 
of them was the first inventor and thus entitled to patent protection 
over their invention.133  The Court’s opinion provides a detailed 
explanation of the long history of the dispute between Armstrong 
and De Forest, including both an interference proceeding at the 
USPTO and litigation in various courts.134  Four separate 
proceedings pitted Armstrong’s priority claim against De Forest’s 
priority claim: (1) an infringement lawsuit commenced by 
Armstrong; (2) an interference proceeding involving patent 
applications filed by Armstrong and De Forest; (3) a declaratory 
judgment action brought by De Forest; and (4) an infringement 
lawsuit filed by De Forest.135 
The first proceeding, the infringement lawsuit filed by 
Armstrong, related to a patent that had issued from a first patent 
application filed by Armstrong, and it resulted in an interlocutory 
 
 132 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).  Radio Corp. is one of the two bases for the Federal Circuit’s invalidity standard.  
The other basis is the statutory presumption of validity. Id. at 1359–60. 
 133 Radio Corp. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1934). 
 134 Id. at 2–7. 
 135 Id. 
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finding on the issue of priority in favor of Armstrong that was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit.136 
The second proceeding, the interference, involved a second 
patent application filed by Armstrong, and it resulted in a finding 
by the Commissioner of Patents giving Armstrong priority.137  The 
D.C. Circuit, however, reversed and decreed priority in favor of De 
Forest.138 
In the third proceeding, the declaratory judgment action, De 
Forest sought to invalidate Armstrong’s patent that had issued 
from the first patent application in light of the holding of the D.C. 
Circuit.139  De Forest succeeded in the district court on the basis 
that Armstrong failed to overcome the presumption of validity 
attaching to the De Forest patents in light of the administrative 
ruling in the D.C. Circuit and the fact that the Second Circuit had 
only affirmed an interlocutory finding related to Armstrong’s first 
patent application, i.e., that no final judgment had been entered.140  
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Armstrong had not 
overcome the presumption of validity attaching to De Forest’s 
patents.141  The Supreme Court affirmed in light of two lines of 
cases.142  The first holds that a decision by the USPTO between 
two parties as to priority “must be accepted as controlling upon 
that question of fact in any subsequent suit between the same 
parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony [that] in 
character and amount carries thorough conviction.”143  The second 
 
 136 Id. at 3–4. 
 137 Id. at 4. 
 138 Id.   
 139 Id. at 4–5.   
 140 Id. at 5.  It is ironic that a case standing for the presumption of validity and the 
deference due the USPTO, at its heart, is based on a reversal of the USPTO’s decision on 
the issue of priority by a court. See id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 5–6 (citing Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1894)).  Notably, this basis for 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion relies upon a concept similar to res judicata.  Indeed, in 
the earlier case upon which it relied, Morgan v. Daniels, the Court found that the 
USPTO’s resolution of priority between two parties should be upheld in subsequent 
litigation between the same two parties unless error can be shown by a burden similar to 
clear and convincing evidence: “thorough conviction.” Id. at 125 (“[W]here the question 
decided in the [USPTO] is one between contesting parties as to priority of invention, the 
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holds that findings of lower courts will be accepted by the 
Supreme Court “unless clear error is shown.”144 
In the fourth proceeding, the lawsuit filed by the assignee of De 
Forest’s patents, Radio Corporation of America (“RCA”) alleged 
infringement by Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (“REL”), a 
third party unrelated to Armstrong.145  REL, however, aligned 
itself with Armstrong, and Armstrong funded its defense.146  
Significantly, the Court noted that the “evidence in this suit . . . is a 
repetition, word for word, of the evidence in the earlier suits, so far 
as material to the conflicting claims of Armstrong and De 
Forest.”147  The district court held that REL did not succeed in 
invalidating De Forest’s patents.148  The Second Circuit, however, 
reversed and held—as the same court did eleven years before—
that Armstrong was the first inventor.149  The Supreme Court 
granted review.150 
With all of this history in mind, the Supreme Court proceeded 
to address the question raised: whether to affirm the Second 
Circuit’s invalidation of De Forest’s patents.  After recognizing 
that the judgments in the lawsuits between Armstrong and De 
Forest and their respective assignees were not res judicata as to 
REL, the Court explained that the standard for proving invalidity 
of the De Forest patents was high: 
A patent regularly issued, and even more obviously 
a patent issued after a hearing of all the rival 
claimants, is presumed to be valid until the 
 
decision there made must be accepted as controlling upon that question of fact in any 
subsequent suit between the same parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony 
which in character and amount carries thorough conviction.”).  Thus, the holding of 
Morgan does not stand for the proposition that a broad presumption of validity attaches to 
every patent, requiring clear and convincing evidence to invalidate the patent in every 
instance. 
 144 Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 6 (citing United States v. State Inv. Co., 264 U.S. 206, 211 
(1924)). 
 145 Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 6. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 6–7. 
 150 Id. at 7. 
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presumption has been overcome by convincing 
evidence of error. . . .  [O]ne otherwise an infringer 
who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face 
bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails unless 
his evidence has more than a dubious 
preponderance.151 
Thus, the Court indicated that a patent “regularly issued,” and 
even more so one issued “after a hearing of all of the rival 
claimants,” is presumed to be valid until this presumption of 
validity is overcome by “convincing evidence of error.”152  
Moreover, the Court indicated that an alleged infringer challenging 
the validity of a patent “fair upon its face” bears a “heavy” burden 
of proof that is higher than a mere “preponderance.”153 
The Court went on to focus on the appropriateness of this 
standard in various circumstances: 
If that is true where the assailant connects himself 
in some way with the title of the true inventor, it is 
so a fortiori where he is a stranger to the invention, 
without claim of title of his own.  If it is true where 
the assailant launches his attack with evidence 
different, at least in form, from any theretofore 
produced in opposition to the patent, it is so a bit 
more clearly where the evidence is even verbally 
the same.154 
The first sentence indicates that this standard applies regardless 
of whether the alleged infringer claims to be a prior inventor.  The 
second sentence indicates that this standard applies regardless of 
whether the alleged infringer uses evidence “different in form” or 
exactly the same as evidence previously used against the patent at 
issue. 
In the end, the Court determined that it would not contradict its 
previous holding as to priority between De Forest and 
 
 151 Id. at 7–8. 
 152 Id. (emphasis added). 
 153 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 154 Id.  
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Armstrong.155  In the prior appeal raising the priority dispute, it 
had determined that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the 
presumption of validity “in any clear or certain way,” and in this 
case its reexamination of the record failed to convince it that its 
prior determination was wrong.156 
Several points concerning Radio Corp. are important to 
consider.  The first and most significant point is that, as shown by 
the detailed summary of the case presented above, the facts 
addressed by the Court concerned a matter litigated repeatedly in 
various courts, between the rival claimants, and using the same 
evidence.  Any of the statements in Radio Corp. must be 
understood in this context.  The Court was not addressing a case 
involving new evidence of invalidity, let alone better evidence of 
invalidity. 
Second, in the end, even the Court’s statements concerning 
application of the clear and convincing burden of proof focused on 
patents “regularly issued,” patents “fair upon [their] face,” and 
patents “issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants.”  Only in 
these circumstances did the Court conclude that there is a 
presumption of validity that requires clear and convincing evidence 
to overcome.157  Thus, the Court left open the door to a lesser 
burden of proof in certain circumstances. 
In particular, the qualifications “regularly issued” and “after a 
hearing of all of the rival claimants” indicate that a patent is not 
“presumed to be valid until the presumption has been overcome by 
convincing evidence of error” if (a) the patent is not regularly 
issued or (b) the USPTO did not consider all of the rival claimants.  
Moreover, the reference to “convincing evidence of error” 
indicates that the actions of the USPTO should be reviewed for 
error, not necessarily that the invalidity of the patent should be 
reviewed under a clear and convincing burden of proof.  Similarly, 
the qualification “fair upon its face” indicates that an alleged 
infringer challenging the validity of a patent does not bear a heavy 
 
 155 Id. at 10. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See also Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 373–74 (1928) 
(noting that the submission to the USPTO of false evidence material to the issuance of 
the patent may overcome or at least affect the application of the presumption of validity). 
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burden of proof that is higher than a “mere preponderance” if the 
patent is not fair upon its face.  Moreover, while “regularly issued” 
and “fair upon its face” are phrases subject to interpretation, one 
reasonable interpretation of these phrases is that the patent 
applicant disclosed the most relevant prior art to the USPTO for its 
consideration before issuing the patent.  In the absence of this 
disclosure, one might reasonably conclude that the patent did not 
“regularly issue” or was not “fair upon its face.” 
Third, it is important to understand the precedent relied upon in 
Radio Corp.  That precedent related to instances in which an 
alleged infringer relied upon mere testimony of witnesses to prove 
prior invention.158  The holdings of those cases focus on the 
question of corroboration of an alleged prior invention and, in 
particular, corroboration of an alleged reduction to practice.159  In 
the absence of corroboration of prior invention, the Court 
effectively held in those cases, doubt existed that should be 
resolved against the alleged prior inventor.160  To the extent that an 
 
 158 See Washburn & Moen Mfg. v. Beat ‘Em All Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 285 
(1892); Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 696 (1886); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 120, 123–24 (1873).  
 159 Washburn, 143 U.S. at 285 (holding that “the frequency with which testimony is 
tortured, or fabricated outright, to build up the defense of a prior use of the thing 
patented” justifies placing the burden of proving prior use on the alleged infringer and 
resolving every reasonable doubt against him); Cantrell, 117 U.S. at 696 (noting that 
every reasonable doubt should be resolved against a party asserting prior invention when 
the proof depended upon the testimony of two witnesses who did not produce a working 
device or model of a working device but instead merely presented drawings made six 
years after one of the witnesses claimed to have sold the device to the second witness); 
Coffin, 85 U.S. at 123–24 (holding that every reasonable doubt should be resolved against 
an alleged infringer attempting to prove prior invention based on the testimony of four 
witnesses and that the focus of the analysis of the alleged infringer’s proof should be on 
whether the alleged prior use was “embryonic or inchoate; if it rested in speculation or 
experiment; if the process pursued for its development had failed to reach the point of 
consummation”); see also Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing 
Washburn for the proposition that “without some type of corroborating evidence, an 
alleged inventor’s testimony cannot satisfy the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ 
standard”); Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 513 F.2d 932, 936 (6th Cir. 1975) 
(explaining that while “the source of the ‘clear and convincing’ standard springs from 
these early decisions . . . [they] seem to have confined this strict standard to those cases 
where a prior use was undertaken to be proved by oral testimony” and noting “[a]n 
apparent expansion of this rationale” in Radio Corp.). 
 160 In response to the proposal by the Federal Trade Commission that the preponderance 
burden of proof apply in litigation to the issue of invalidity in all instances, FED. TRADE 
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alleged infringer attempts to rely on oral testimony alone, the same 
result—a finding of no invalidity—can be achieved if the law 
makes clear that uncorroborated testimony regarding invalidity 
cannot as a matter of law rise to the level of a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Fourth, the Supreme Court’s holding in Radio Corp. fails to 
address or resolve the issue of whether the burden of proving 
invalidity should be a preponderance of the evidence when more 
relevant prior art is asserted in litigation than the prior art 
considered by the USPTO. 
iii. Supreme Court Opinions After Radio Corp. v. Radio 
Engineering Laboratories, Inc. 
The Supreme Court has issued a number of opinions after 
Radio Corp. that highlight how the Court and its members 
understand the presumption of validity and Radio Corp. itself.  
These opinions indicate that disagreement and unresolved 
questions remain over the meaning and effect of the presumption 
of validity and the holding in Radio Corp. itself. 
In Williams Manufacturing Co. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Co.,161 for example, the Court affirmed a judgment that a patent 
was infringed and not invalid without addressing the presumption 
of validity or Radio Corp.  Justice Black, however, dissented, with 
Justices Douglas and Murphy concurring in the dissent.  The 
dissent expressed disagreement with the lower courts’ application 
of Radio Corp.162  In particular, Justice Black disagreed with their 
 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY, ch. 5, at 26–28 (2003), the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (“AIPLA”) focused its response on Radio Corp. and Supreme Court case law 
addressing the need for corroboration of oral testimony of prior uses and prior invention, 
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER 2003 FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION REPORT—“TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY,” 6–16 (2004).  Notably, the AIPLA ignored 
the precedent of every circuit court other than the Federal Circuit.  But even the AIPLA 
concluded that once the existence, authentication, availability, and scope of evidence is 
established by clear and convincing evidence, “the burden should be that the persuasive 
force of such facts demonstrates patent invalidity by a fair preponderance, not some 
elevated standard.” Id. at 16. 
 161 316 U.S. 364 (1942). 
 162 Id. at 392 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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determination that the patent-in-suit was “a patent fair upon its 
face” and that the evidence of non-patentability amounted to “no 
more than a ‘dubious preponderance.’”163  Importantly, Justice 
Black found no reason for extending the presumption of validity 
arising from the mere issuance of a patent “beyond the narrow 
compass” indicated by Radio Corp. absent a statutory prescription 
to the contrary.164  Rather, he found several reasons for not 
extending the presumption any further: (1) a patent is a grant of an 
exclusive privilege yet it is normally issued in a non-adversary 
proceeding; (2) at the time the USPTO kept patent applications on 
file in secrecy until the time of issuance; (3) the public is 
represented only insofar as the enormous volume of business 
permits the examining staff of the USPTO to watch out for the 
public interest; (4) patent examiners, unlike courts, do not have the 
benefit of the results of investigations into the state of the prior art 
by adversaries; and (5) even where the USPTO conducts 
interference proceedings, the parties are not permitted to prove that 
a third party was the first inventor.165 
Significantly, Justice Black expressed the view that the 
presumption arising from the issuance of a patent should be given 
“small weight.”166  Moreover, he explained that, at very best, the 
presumption might be permitted to tip the scale when other 
considerations leave the issue of patentability in equilibrium.167  In 
this way, Justice Black highlighted that, in his view, the 
presumption of validity only places a preponderance burden of 
proof on an alleged infringer. 
 
 163 Id.  Presumably Justice Black concluded that the “prerequisites for establishing a 
presumption of validity are not here present” because the patent-in-suit was not “fair 
upon its face,” and not because the evidence of invalidity exceeded a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Otherwise, Justice Black was putting the cart (whether the evidence of 
invalidity rises to the required level) before the horse (whether the presumption of 
validity applies).  This assumes, however, that the presumption of validity dictates the 
level of proof required to invalidate a patent.  If the presumption of validity is 
synonymous with the ultimate question of validity, Justice Black may have concluded 
that the fact that the evidence of invalidity exceeded a preponderance of the evidence 
meant that the presumption of validity did not apply. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 392–93. 
 166 Id. at 393. 
 167 Id. 
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Even after Congress codified the presumption of validity in 
1952 after Williams Manufacturing Co.,168 some Supreme Court 
justices continued to voice their concern with the application of the 
presumption of validity by the lower courts.  In Shultz v. Moore,169 
for example, Justice Douglas—still on the bench thirty-two years 
after he joined Justice Black’s dissent in Williams Manufacturing 
Co.—dissented from the denial of a petition for writ of 
certiorari.170  Justice Douglas in part faulted the Tenth Circuit for 
holding that patents carry a presumption of validity that can be 
overcome “only be clear and convincing evidence.”171  He 
explained that courts cannot rely on the USPTO always to issue 
valid patents, because (1) patent prosecution proceedings are non-
adversarial; (2) applicants are persistent; (3) applicants may appeal 
adverse administrative decisions but no corresponding check is 
available to overturn erroneous findings of patentability; (4) as a 
practical matter errors on the side of patentability “slip through 
[the] process”; and (5) litigation of patent validity presents the only 
opportunity for “judicial correction of the errors of generosity.”172  
Thus, in both Williams Manufacturing Co. and Shultz, Supreme 
Court justices indicated their disagreement with broad 
interpretations or applications of Radio Corp. to require clear and 
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity. 
Later, in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, 
Inc.,173 the Court itself—no longer just dissenting justices—noted 
that the strength of the presumption of validity varies depending on 
the particular circumstances.174  In particular, the Court held that 
the presumption of validity “lack[ed] some of its earlier strength” 
when the Federal Circuit vacated a judgment of invalidity based 
 
 168 Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in various sections 
of Title 35 of the United States Code). 
 169 419 U.S. 930 (1974). 
 170 Id. at 930–32 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 171 Id. at 930. 
 172 Id. at 932. 
 173 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
 174 See id. at 94 n.15. 
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upon its affirmance of a judgment of noninfringement of the same 
patent.175 
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the 
presumption of validity is KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.176  
There, the Court did not reach the question of whether the failure 
to disclose a prior art reference during prosecution voids the 
presumption of validity given to issued patents.177  It did, however, 
note that “the rationale underlying the presumption—that the 
[USPTO], in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much 
diminished” in this situation.178 
Viewed as a whole, the opinions that have issued since Radio 
Corp. reveal that the Supreme Court and its members may interpret 
the presumption of validity and Radio Corp. differently than has 
the Federal Circuit.  In particular, the Court might hold that the 
presumption of validity only requires invalidity to be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence in at least some circumstances, that 
the presumption of validity does not require clear and convincing 
evidence of invalidity, or that the strength of the presumption of 
validity varies depending on the circumstances. 
iv. Social Disutility Analysis 
While all of the Supreme Court precedent discussed above 
addresses the presumption of validity, there is other Supreme Court 
precedent relevant to the question of the appropriate invalidity 
standard.  In particular, as the Federal Circuit has recognized,179 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly utilized the “social disutility” 
analysis to determine appropriate burdens of proof.180 
 
 175 Id. (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, all patents are presumed valid.  Although that 
presumption is obviously resurrected after the Federal Circuit vacates a finding of 
invalidity, Morton’s current situation makes clear that the revived presumption lacks 
some of its earlier strength.”). 
 176 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 177 Id. at 426. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1193–94 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 180 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754–55 (1982); California v. Mitchell Bros.’ 
Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1981); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 
(1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The social disutility analysis can be used to determine the 
appropriate burden of proof to apply to an issue in litigation.  It 
requires an assessment of the social disutility of erroneous findings 
on that issue.181  In the context of invalidity of patents, for 
example, the social disutility of an erroneous finding that a patent 
is invalid must be compared with the social disutility of an 
erroneous finding that a patent is not invalid.  This comparison 
explains the appropriate burden of proof, which in the civil context 
will be either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and 
convincing evidence.182  A preponderance of the evidence burden 
of proof indicates that the social disutility of an erroneous finding 
that a truly valid patent is invalid is comparable to the social 
disutility of an erroneous finding that a truly invalid patent is not 
invalid.183  A clear and convincing evidence burden of proof 
indicates that the social disutility of an erroneous finding that a 
truly valid patent is invalid is much greater than the social 
disutility of an erroneous finding that a truly invalid patent is not 
invalid.184 
In the invalidity context, as discussed above, the USPTO 
applies the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to the 
issue of invalidity in the first instance.185  Viewed in light of the 
social disutility analysis, the application of the preponderance of 
the evidence burden of proof reflects a comparable level of social 
disutility when a truly valid patent is found invalid and when a 
truly invalid patent is found not invalid.  On the one hand, a patent 
is designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the “Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.”186  On the other hand, a patent is an 
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to 
access to a free and open market, with “far-reaching social and 
economic consequences.”187  The social disutility analysis 
 
 181 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See generally id.  
 184 See generally id.  
 185 See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 186 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 187 Id.  In Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court explained that 
both of these factors favor ensuring that patents issue free from fraud. Id.  These same 
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indicates that the application of the preponderance burden of proof 
to the issue of invalidity reflects an equilibrium behind failing to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts when its promotion 
is appropriate and failing to prevent the unnecessary exception to 
the general rule against monopolies and exclusive access to open 
markets. 
While the social disutility analysis focuses on the social 
disutility resulting from incorrect findings on issues, the analysis 
should also consider the likelihood that a jury or court might come 
to an incorrect conclusion on an issue given any particular burden 
of proof.  In other words, the analysis should weigh the disutility of 
incorrect conclusions only after considering the likelihood that 
either disutility will, in fact, occur.  Normally—when no unbiased, 
expert third party has exercised its judgment on an issue—it is not 
possible to consider this likelihood factor.  But when an examiner 
at the USPTO has considered prior art and exercised his or her 
judgment on the issue, based on his or her presumed experience 
and expertise, it is reasonable to conclude that the USPTO has 
come to the correct conclusion. 
Applying this likelihood factor to the social disutility analysis 
in the context of invalidity, a finding of invalidity by a jury or 
court under a preponderance burden of proof is presumptively 
incorrect when it is based on evidence considered by the USPTO 
because it is at odds with the USPTO’s conclusion.  Thus, the 
disutility associated with finding truly valid patents invalid is 
likely to occur more often when compared to the disutility 
associated with finding a truly invalid patent not invalid.  Factoring 
in the likelihood of the disutility, then, favors applying a clear and 
convincing burden of proof in this situation.  Thus, the clear and 
convincing burden of proof should be used to require the jury or 
court to supplant the expert USPTO’s judgment only when the jury 
is convinced that the USPTO made a mistake.  In other words, the 
clear and convincing burden of proof should apply when the jury 
or court is considering an issue already ruled upon by the USPTO. 
 
factors, however, neatly capture the interests at stake in issuing valid patents and not 
issuing invalid patents. 
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But when the USPTO has not considered the patentability of 
claims in light of the most relevant prior art, there is no deference 
involved.  That is, there is no basis to conclude that the jury or 
court is less likely to make a mistake on the ultimate issue of 
validity, and so a preponderance burden of proof should apply in 
this circumstance, consistent with the burden of proof applied by 
the USPTO itself when it considers an issue in the first instance. 
To summarize, when factoring in the likelihood that a jury or 
court might come to an incorrect conclusion given any particular 
burden of proof, the social disutility analysis supports applying a 
clear and convincing burden of proof on the issue of invalidity 
when the USPTO considered the most relevant prior art.  But in the 
absence of any ability to judge the likelihood that a jury or court 
might come to an incorrect conclusion, i.e., when the USPTO did 
not consider the most relevant prior art and that prior art is 
presented to the jury or court, the social disutility analysis supports 
applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.188 
b) The Law of Every Regional Circuit Prior to Creation of 
the Federal Circuit 
After Radio Corp. and the codification of the presumption of 
validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 but prior to the formation of the Federal 
Circuit, the circuit courts had interpreted and applied Radio Corp. 
and 35 U.S.C. § 282.  Significantly, their interpretations and 
applications conflict with those of the Federal Circuit.189  Every 
 
 188 Adoption of a burden of proof on the issue of invalidity that depends upon 
consideration of prior art by the USPTO also would comport with application of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to the question of the appropriate level of 
deference to be given to findings of validity by the USPTO.  See Stuart Minor Benjamin 
& Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from 
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 293, 299 (2007) (concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 282 
does not displace the APA, that no deference is owed to USPTO factfinding not done in 
light of the introduction of new prior art, and that the legal conclusion of validity is 
subject to the sliding scale of Skidmore deference).  Indeed, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Supreme Court recognized that the weight given to an 
administrative judgment will depend upon, inter alia, “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration.” Id. at 140. 
 189 Others have recognized the conflicting treatment of the presumption of validity by 
the Federal Circuit and the other circuit courts. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent 
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other circuit court of appeals has concluded that the presumption of 
validity is at least weakened in some situations, such as when 
“relevant,” “significant,” “pertinent,” “more pertinent,” or the 
“most pertinent” prior art was not considered by the USPTO.  In 
this way, the courts have effectively concluded that the statutory 
presumption of validity only requires a presumption that the 
USPTO correctly ruled upon the evidence in front of it—not that 
the USPTO considered the most relevant prior art or that it, 
illogically, correctly ruled upon evidence that it did not even 
consider.  Furthermore, many of the other courts have adopted a 
cumulativeness test, requiring the uncited prior art to be non-
cumulative as compared to the cited prior art before finding the 
presumption of validity overcome.  And some of the other circuit 
courts have concluded that alleged infringers may prove invalidity 
by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and 
convincing evidence, in at least some situations.190 
The law of each circuit court of appeals will be analyzed in 
detail below. 
i. The First Circuit 
The First Circuit has held that prior art not considered by the 
USPTO—especially in combination with evidence of omissions or 
inaccuracies in prior art presented—as well as “highly pertinent” 
but uncited prior art “eviscerates,” “overcomes,” or “weakens” the 
 
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1, 18–19 (2004). 
 190 While at least one professor has indicated that the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to 
“squarely” adopt a burden of proof less than clear and convincing evidence in any 
situation, see Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious 
Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 928 (2004), a careful review of the case 
law indicates that many circuits applied a burden less than clear and convincing evidence 
when the most relevant prior art was not considered by the USPTO, as shown below.  
The analysis below is supported by more contemporary analysis. See also Gerald Sobel, 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on 
Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1092–93 (1988) (indicating that the 
Second and Eighth Circuits required alleged infringers to overcome the presumption of 
validity only by a “preponderance of the evidence, or by substantial evidence” and that 
various other circuits qualified application of a clear and convincing burden by 
acknowledging that alleged infringers “could weaken the presumption of validity by 
demonstrating that the patent examiner did not review all of the relevant prior art 
references during prosecution of the application for patent”). 
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presumption of validity.191  In one case, the court held that the 
presumption of validity is strengthened where a district court holds 
that the claims are not invalid.192  And in another case, the court 
applied a burden of proof less than clear and convincing evidence 
because the USPTO was not directed to instances of relevant prior 
art.193 
ii. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is 
“weakened,” “undercut,” “severely undercut,” “substantially 
weakened,” or that there is “no strong presumption” at all when the 
USPTO has not considered prior art, “relevant prior art,” 
“significant prior art,” “important prior art,” or “much of the prior 
art.”194  According to the Second Circuit, the fact that prior art 
relied upon in litigation was not before the examiner “detracts” 
from the presumption of validity.195 
Conversely, the Second Circuit has held that the presumption 
of validity is “strengthened,” “heightened,” or “entitled to 
particular weight” by the USPTO’s consideration, “adequate 
consideration,” or “careful consideration” of a prior art 
 
 191 See, e.g., Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 717 F.2d 622, 628 (1st Cir. 1983); 
Shanklin Corp. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 521 F.2d 609, 616–18 (1st Cir. 1975); 
Boyajian v. Old Colony Envelope Co., 279 F.2d 572, 575 n.4 (1st Cir. 1960); see also 
Gross v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 F.2d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 1975) (noting that the USPTO did 
not have before it the evidence of lack of utility, including the admission of the plaintiff, 
and affirming the district court’s factual finding as not clearly erroneous); Marasco v. 
Compo Shoe Mach. Corp., 325 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir. 1963) (holding that the 
presumption of validity gathered from the fact that the examiner cited the prior art at 
issue was “sufficiently overcome”). 
 192 Int’l Paper Box Mach. Co. v. Specialty Automatic Mach. Corp., 414 F.2d 1254, 
1262 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 193 Futorian Mfg. Corp. v. Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc., 528 F.2d 941, 943–44 (1st Cir. 
1976). 
 194 See Julie Research Labs., Inc. v. Guildline Instruments, Inc., 501 F.2d 1131, 1136 
(2d Cir. 1974); Lemelson v. Topper Corp., 450 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1971); Reeves 
Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 417 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1969); Cont’l Can Co. v. 
Old Dominion Box Co., 393 F.2d 321, 326 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968); Audio Devices, Inc. v. 
Armour Research Found., 293 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Triax Co. v. 
Hartman Metal Fabricators, Inc., 479 F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1973); see, e.g., Zoomar, 
Inc. v. Paillard Prods., Inc., 258 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 195 See Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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reference.196  In one case, the court indicated that, while the 
presumption of validity “may be slight in the light of the normal 
procedures of the [USPTO],” it is heightened by a showing that the 
prior art was “adequately considered.”197 
The Second Circuit has noted, however, that the weight to be 
attached to the determination of examiners “must be very limited,” 
and is “totally unlike” the weight accorded the determination of an 
administrative agency after an adversary proceeding.198  Likewise, 
it has recognized that “nothing is more common” in a suit for 
infringement than to find that “all the important references are 
turned up for the first time by the industry of a defendant whose 
interest animates his search,” and that “[i]t is a reasonable caution 
not to tie the hands of a whole art until there is at least the added 
assurance which comes from such an incentive.”199  Indeed, the 
court has held that the presumption of validity serves to place the 
burden of proof on the person who asserts invalidity and that, “in 
the usual case,” a preponderance of the evidence determines the 
issue.200 
In one of its last opinions on the subject, the Second Circuit 
recognized that the reason for the presumption of validity is that 
the USPTO is staffed by expert and experienced personnel 
uniquely qualified to determine patentability, but that its “heavy 
workload” requires “searching review” by courts.201 
iii. The Third Circuit 
 
 196 See Rooted Hair, Inc. v. Ideal Toy Corp., 329 F.2d 761, 763 (2d Cir. 1964); see also 
Shackelton v. J. Kaufman Iron Works, Inc., 689 F.2d 334, 339 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 132–33 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 197 Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 372 F.2d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 
1967); see also Rich Prods. Corp. v. Mitchell Foods, Inc., 357 F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 
1966) (explaining that the presumption is strengthened where the same questions raised 
in litigation were raised in prosecuting the patent in the USPTO and there successfully 
met). 
 198 Lorenz v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105–06 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 199 Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
 200 Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 201 Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 679 F.2d 1023, 1028–29 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 
Kahn v. Dynamics Corp., 508 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1974) (indicating that the 
presumption has been weakened in recent years by the fact that the USPTO is too 
overworked to give adequate attention to patent applications). 
C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2011  10:20 PM 
2011] CLEAR BUT UNCONVINCING 347 
On the one hand, the Third Circuit has held that the 
presumption of validity is “weakened” or “overcome” when a 
party asserts “significant,” “pertinent,” or “relevant” prior art—or 
“important portions” of a prior art reference—in litigation that was 
not considered by the USPTO.202  On the other hand, the Third 
Circuit has held that, where the USPTO considered prior art 
invoked in litigation by an alleged infringer, the presumption of 
validity is “further reinforced.”203  And it has specified that when 
the USPTO allows a patent after interference proceedings the 
presumption of validity is “strengthened.”204 
In one particular opinion, the Third Circuit explained that 
where pertinent prior art has been considered by the USPTO the 
presumption of validity is “often strengthened,” that where 
relevant prior art has not been considered by the USPTO the 
presumption is “weakened or overcome,” and that where “relevant 
prior art has not been considered “the degree by which the 
presumption is weakened depends on a balancing of the pertinence 
of the newly cited art against the pertinence of the art actually 
considered by the [USPTO].”205  In that case, the court found that 
non-cumulative prior art rendered an asserted patent invalid.206 
iv. The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is 
“weakened,” “weakened or destroyed,” or “very much weakened” 
 
 202 See N. Eng’g & Plastics Corp. v. Eddy, 652 F.2d 333, 337–38 (3d Cir. 1981); Arrow 
Safety Device Co. v. Nassau Fastening Co., 496 F.2d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1974); Layne-
N.Y. Co. v. Allied Asphalt Co., 501 F.2d 405, 407 (3d Cir. 1974); U.S. Expansion Bolt 
Co. v. Jordan Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1973); Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter 
Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 n.33 (3d Cir. 1972); Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. 
Corp. v. Thermal & Elecs. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1971); Chem. 
Constr. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 311 F.2d 367, 374 n.1 (3d Cir. 1962); 
Dole Refrigerating Co. v. Amerio Contact Plate Freezers, Inc., 265 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir. 
1959); see also Scripto, Inc. v. Ferber Corp., 267 F.2d 308, 308 (3d Cir. 1959) (indicating 
that the fact that “a wealth of relevant prior art had not been called to the attention” of the 
examiner “detracted materially from the importance of the presumption” of validity). 
 203 Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Am. Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., 
546 F.2d 530, 540 n.28 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 204 United Mattress Mach. Co. v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 207 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 
1953). 
 205 Aluminum Co. v. Amerola Prods. Corp., 552 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 206 Id. at 1025. 
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when “relevant” or “pertinent” prior art was not considered by the 
examiner, and that the presumption “can be given little weight” 
when the examiner considered “none of the devices found in the 
prior art.”207 
The court has also held that the presumption of validity is 
“strengthened” or “reinforced” where the “principal references” 
were considered by the examiner, where the alleged infringer cites 
the same prior art considered by the examiner, where alleged 
infringers are unable to come up with any prior art “more 
pertinent” than prior art considered by the examiner, or where 
there were “extensive administrative proceedings” concerned with 
the prior art.208  In one case, the Fourth Circuit distinguished 
Supreme Court precedent requiring proof of invalidity beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence, including 
Radio Corp., because in those cases the issue was priority of the 
same invention between two inventors rather than invalidity “by 
reason of relevant disclosures of prior art.”209  The court went on to 
state that the presumption of validity is strengthened to some 
extent by “the more than usual consideration given to the problem 
of patentability in the [USPTO]” and weakened to some extent 
because the USPTO did not consider some of the prior art asserted 
in the litigation.210 
v. The Fifth Circuit 
In 1970, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the opinions of the 
various circuit courts “are in a morass of conflict” on the issue of 
 
 207 See Christopher J. Foster, Inc. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 531 
F.2d 1243, 1245 (4th Cir. 1975); Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 489 
F.2d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1973); Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of 
S.C., 407 F.2d 557, 561 (4th Cir. 1969); Marston v. J.C. Penney Co., 353 F.2d 976, 982 
(4th Cir. 1965); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. McDowell Co., 317 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 
1963); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 244 F.2d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1957). 
 208 See Marston, 353 F.2d at 982; see also Power Curbers, Inc. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 
298 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1962); Manville Boiler Co. v. Columbia Boiler Co., 269 F.2d 
600, 604 (4th Cir. 1959); Otto v. Koppers Co., 246 F.2d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 1957); Brown 
v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1957); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Aghnides, 246 F.2d 
718, 721 (4th Cir. 1957); Reynolds v. Whitin Mach. Works, 167 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 
1948). 
 209 Universal Inc. v. Kay Mfg. Corp., 301 F.2d 140, 148 (4th Cir. 1962). 
 210 Id. 
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the appropriate burden of proof on invalidity.211  This recognition, 
however, related to the ultimate burden of proof—clear and 
convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence, or proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, even after Radio Corp.—and not 
whether the presumption of validity is weakened when more 
pertinent prior art is advanced in litigation when compared to the 
prior art considered by the USPTO.212 
Indeed, like every other regional circuit at the time, the Fifth 
Circuit’s precedent held that the presumption of validity 
“vanishes” or is “measurably weakened,” “seriously weakened,” 
“mitigated,” “weakened,” “greatly weakened,” “severely 
weakened,” “weakened, if not destroyed,” or “greatly weakened if 
not dispelled” if the USPTO did not consider “pertinent,” “a 
particular,” “more similar,” “all,” “an important element of,” or 
“highly pertinent”  prior art—or simply when prior art was not 
submitted to the USPTO.213 
Two of the last few Fifth Circuit cases to address the 
presumption of validity and its effect on the burden of proof on the 
issue of invalidity, prior to exclusive jurisdiction over these cases 
being lodged in the Federal Circuit, are noteworthy.  In the first, 
the Fifth Circuit indicated that, to rebut the presumption of 
validity, a party seeking to invalidate a patent must show, not only 
that the USPTO failed to consider pertinent prior art, but also that 
the evidence is not cumulative.214  Yet the court in that case still 
 
 211 Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Escambia Chem. Corp., 430 F.2d 920, 924–25 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 212 Id. 
 213 See, e.g., Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng’g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1143 (5th Cir. 1982); Ebeling 
v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 909, 913 n.11 (5th Cir. 1982); Cont’l Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 
F.2d 188, 195 (5th Cir. 1981); Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 
1057, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981); Arbrook, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 645 F.2d 273, 276 
n.1 (5th Cir. 1981); Huron Mach. Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222, 
224 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zink Co. v. Nat’l Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547, 551 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Catholic Prot. Serv. v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 594 F.2d 499, 505 (5th Cir. 
1979); Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 
1978); Steelcase, Inc. v. Delwood Furniture Co., 578 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1978); Parker 
v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1975); Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat’l 
Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1955); Fritz W. Glitsch & Sons, Inc. v. Wyatt Metal 
& Boiler Works, 224 F.2d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 214 May v. Am. S.W. Waterbed Distribs., Inc., 715 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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required that the proof of invalidity—even in light of a non-
cumulative reference—“be more than a preponderance of the 
evidence.”215  In the second case, however, the Fifth Circuit, 
breaking with its own precedent,216 held that the introduction of 
evidence that the USPTO failed to consider relevant prior art 
reduces the burden of proof from clear and convincing evidence to 
a preponderance of the evidence.217  Thus, while there are cases in 
the Fifth Circuit holding that the failure of the USPTO to consider 
prior art reduces the burden to prove invalidity from clear and 
convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence, the Fifth 
Circuit has issued opinions directly contradicting one another on 
this issue.218 
vi. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is 
“greatly strengthened” where “the most pertinent prior art” has 
been considered by the USPTO.219  The court also has held that the 
presumption of validity is “largely if not wholly vitiated,” “greatly 
weakened,” “greatly weakened and largely dissipated,” “seriously 
weakened,” “weakened or destroyed,” or just “weakened” if “the 
 
 215 Id. 
 216 See, e.g., id.; Reed Tool Co., 672 F.2d at 526; Ludlow Corp., 636 F.2d at 1059. 
 217 A.B. Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 218 Compare Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., 506 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[P]ertinent 
prior art not considered by the [USPTO] weakens the presumption of validity which 
normally attaches to a patent and requires a court to scrutinize the patent more closely.  
Nevertheless, the presumption of validity is a strong one and is not to be overthrown 
except by clear and cogent evidence, that is, ‘evidence (which) has more than a dubious 
preponderance.’” (quoting Radio Corp. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934))) with 
A.B. Baumstimler, 677 F.2d at 1066–68 (“Where the validity of a patent is challenged for 
failure to consider prior art, the bases for the presumption of validity, the acknowledged 
experience and expertise of the [USPTO] personnel and the recognition that patent 
approval is a species of administrative determination supported by evidence, no longer 
exist and thus the challenger of the validity of the patent need no longer bear the heavy 
burden of establishing invalidity either ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ or ‘by clear and 
convincing evidence.’ . . .  Given the introduction of evidence that the [USPTO] failed to 
consider relevant prior art . . . the standard of proof required . . . to overcome the 
presumption of validity of the patents was not ‘clear and convincing’ but simply a 
preponderance of the evidence.” (citation omitted)). 
 219 Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 1983); Nat’l 
Rolled Thread Die Co. v. E.W. Ferry Screw Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 
1976); Bolkcom v. Carborundum Co., 523 F.2d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1975). 
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most relevant,” “applicable,” “pertinent,” “highly relevant,” or 
“most pertinent” prior art is not considered by the USPTO.220  In 
one case the court indicated that “it is axiomatic” that the “limited 
force” of the presumption of validity can be weakened or destroyed 
where it is shown that the most relevant prior art was not disclosed 
to the examiner.221 
The Sixth Circuit, like the Third Circuit, has explained that the 
degree by which the presumption is weakened when relevant prior 
art was not considered by the USPTO depends upon a balancing of 
the pertinence of the newly cited prior art and the pertinence of the 
prior art considered by the patent examiner.222  In addition, the 
Sixth Circuit—again like the Third Circuit—has applied a 
cumulativeness test to prior art not considered by the USPTO, 
noting that it must be prior art that would “ordinarily be expected 
to influence the examiner with respect to the patentability of the 
invention” but not prior art that is cumulative to cited prior art.223 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the presumption of 
validity merely serves to allocate to the party claiming invalidity 
the burden of proof and that that burden in the typical case is proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence.224 
 
 220 Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167, 176 (6th Cir. 1985); Dollar 
Elec. Co. v. Syndevco, Inc., 688 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1982); Universal Elec. Co. v. 
A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1981); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Letica 
Corp., 617 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1980); Eltra Corp. v. Basic Inc., 599 F.2d 745, 754 
n.18 (6th Cir. 1979); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Acorn Bldg. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 
155, 160 (6th Cir. 1977); Nat. Rolled Thread Die Co., 541 F.2d at 597; Bolkcom, 523 
F.2d at 498; Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 221 Eltra Corp., 599 F.2d at 754 n.18; Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co. v. Detroit 
Gasket & Mfg. Co., 148 F.2d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 1945). 
 222 Am. Seating Co. v. Nat’l Seating Co., 586 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1978); Tee-Pak, 
Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974).  The Sixth Circuit has 
also explained that, while the presumption of validity is weakened if applicable prior art 
is not considered by the USPTO, it is not necessarily destroyed because the alleged 
infringer “must do more to invalidate the presumption than merely showing the [prior art] 
was not cited by the [USPTO].”  Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 
265, 271 (6th Cir. 1964). 
 223 Schnading Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383, 390–91 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 224 See Saginaw Prods. Corp. v. E. Airlines, Inc., 615 F.2d 1136, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(“The patent was presumed to be valid because it was regularly issued by the [USPTO].  
Offering the patent in evidence, as the plaintiff did, established a prima facie case of 
validity. . . . The burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish its affirmative 
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vii. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is 
“largely if not wholly” dissipated when “pertinent” prior art is not 
considered by the USPTO, and that the degree by which it is 
weakened depends on a balancing of the pertinence of the newly 
cited prior art with the pertinence of the prior art considered by the 
USPTO.225  In this regard, it has held that the presumption is 
“destroyed” when the examiner did not consider “the most 
pertinent” prior art.226  Interestingly, the issue of cumulativeness is 
addressed in some Seventh Circuit cases, but using different 
terminology.  In those cases the issue is “equivalency”—whether 
the prior art asserted in litigation is “equivalent” to prior art 
considered by the examiner.227 
While, as mentioned, some Seventh Circuit cases indicate that 
balancing of the pertinence of prior art is required, other Seventh 
Circuit cases have not balanced the pertinence of the prior art at all 
and instead have found that the presumption does not exist simply 
because prior art was not before the USPTO.228  The court has 
gone so far as to say that “even one prior art reference” not 
 
defenses by a preponderance of evidence.”); Eltra Corp. v. Basic Inc., 599 F.2d 745, 750 
(6th Cir. 1979) (“The presumption has no independent evidentiary significance, however, 
as it merely serves to allocate to the party claiming invalidity the burden of proving it.  In 
the typical case such as this, where the bulk of the evidence of the prior art is contained in 
documents, the party claiming obviousness need only do so by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” (citations omitted)). 
 225 National Bus. Sys., Inc. v. AM Int’l, Inc., 743 F.2d 1227, 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
 226 Moore v. Wesbar Corp., 701 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Shemitz v. 
Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that where anticipating prior 
art was not before the examiner there is no longer a presumption of validity).  The 
Seventh Circuit has even indicated that the presumption may be diminished by the 
submission to the USPTO of a long list of prior art “without identifying the most relevant 
prior art.”  Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724, 731–32 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 227 Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 337 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Deere & Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 658 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 228 Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646 F.2d 1201, 1208 (7th Cir. 1981); Hyster Co. v. Hunt 
Foods, Inc., 263 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1959); Hobbs v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 250 
F.2d 100, 105 (7th Cir. 1957). 
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considered by the USPTO can “overthrow” the presumption of 
validity.229 
A particularly important Seventh Circuit case is Chicago 
Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. Crane Packing Co.230  In an 
opinion by then-Judge Stevens that issued just three months prior 
to his escalation to the Supreme Court, the court explained that the 
presumption of validity includes two aspects.  First, the 
presumption places a burden of persuasion on the alleged infringer 
that remains upon the alleged infringer throughout the proceeding 
and “is in no sense dependent on the character of the proceedings 
before the [USPTO] or the amount of prior art cited to, or 
considered by, the Patent Examiner.”231  Second, the presumption 
requires the alleged infringer to make a “clear and cogent” 
showing of invalidity in order to prevail when the prior art cited to 
establish invalidity has already been considered by the USPTO.232  
Then-Judge Stevens explained that this additional aspect to the 
presumption relates to the deference due the technical expertise 
possessed by the USPTO.233 
Significantly, then-Judge Stevens went on to explain that 
consideration of prior art by the USPTO justifies the clear and 
convincing burden of proof but not some higher burden of proof.234  
Conversely, he explained that the requirement that invalidity be 
established by clear and convincing evidence “is largely, if not 
wholly, dissipated when pertinent prior art is shown not to have 
been considered by the [USPTO].”235  He explained why: 
For then the Examiner’s expertise may have been 
applied to an incomplete set of data and there can be 
no certainty that he would have arrived at the same 
conclusion in the face of the evidence and argument 
presented to the court.  Nor may we safely assume 
 
 229 Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Henry Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Filters Corp., 489 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 230 523 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 231 Id. at 457–58. 
 232 Id. at 458. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
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that the Examiner has considered art which is not 
cited.  On the contrary, we have held that the failure 
to cite pertinent prior art implies that it was 
overlooked by the Examiner.236 
In this way, then-Judge Stevens focused on whether the 
examiner applied his or her expertise in any particular case and 
highlighted that it is not safe to assume that an examiner considers 
prior art that he or she does not cite.  Accordingly, the Seventh 
Circuit presumes that uncited prior art was overlooked by the 
examiner.237 
In light of Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co., it is not 
surprising that a later Seventh Circuit case expressly held that the 
burden of proof is “less stringent” than clear and convincing when 
“non-equivalent, uncited prior art” was not considered by the 
USPTO,238 or that in another case the court held that the 
presumption of validity “and its commensurate level of proof is 
largely, if not wholly, dissipated when pertinent prior art is not 
considered by the [USPTO].”239 
viii. The Eighth Circuit 
Like the other circuit courts, the Eighth Circuit has held that 
“relevant,” “pertinent,” “the most relevant,” or “applicable” prior 
art not considered by the USPTO, or several prior art references 
not considered by the USPTO, “weakens,” “weakens if not 
completely destroys,” “greatly weakens if not completely 
destroys,” or “substantially weakens” the presumption of 
validity.240  In one case, the court went so far as to say that an 
alleged infringer does not bear the “heavy burden necessary to 
 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 337 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 239 Med. Lab. Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 240 See Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 
548 (8th Cir. 1982); Bolt, Beranek & Newman, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 521 
F.2d 338, 340 (8th Cir. 1975); Ralston Purina Co. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 442 F.2d 389, 
390 (8th Cir. 1971); Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 
989 (8th Cir. 1966); Imperial Stone Cutters, Inc. v. Schwartz, 370 F.2d 425, 429 (8th Cir. 
1966); Piel Mfg. Co. v. George A. Rolfes Co., 363 F.2d 57, 60 n.4 (8th Cir. 1966); John 
Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1964); L.S. Donaldson Co. v. La Maur, 
Inc., 299 F.2d 412, 420 (8th Cir. 1962). 
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overcome a presumption at its full strength” when the USPTO has 
not considered the most relevant of all prior art.241  And it has also 
held that “the presumption of validity is entitled to great weight 
where it appears that the [USPTO] gave careful consideration to 
the applicable prior art.”242 
One case in particular deserves thorough discussion.  In E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co.,243 the Eighth Circuit 
issued an opinion authored by Chief Judge Markey, who sat by 
designation from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.244  In 
this case, the court indicated that the presumption of validity is not 
limited to references actually cited by the examiner.245  Citing 
Solder Removal Co. and additional precedent from other circuits, 
Chief Judge Markey noted that the burden of persuasion remains 
upon the party asserting invalidity whether relevant prior art was or 
was not considered by the USPTO.246  Significantly, the court held 
that the presumption of validity requires courts to find that the 
examiner’s prior art search is “prima facie evidence that the 
examiner considered all of the references classified in the classes 
and subclasses searched” and that the examiner left uncited those 
references he or she regarded as less relevant than those cited.247  
Moreover, the court, without citing any authority, expressed its 
view that by enacting the presumption of validity Congress chose 
to assume that an oversight of relevant prior art did not occur.248  
Otherwise, the court explained, in view of the large number of 
patents in a single class or subclass, the requirement to cite every 
patent inspected would “unreasonably retard the examination 
process.”249  “Thus,” the court concluded, “absent contrary 
evidence, it is improper to conclude that references not specifically 
cited by the examiner, but classified in areas he searched, were not 
 
 241 Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co., 360 F.2d at 989. 
 242 L.S. Donaldson Co., 299 F.2d at 420. 
 243 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 244 Id. at 1254.  
 245 Id. at 1266. 
 246 Id. at 1266 n.30 (citing Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 
628 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
 247 Id. at 1267. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
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considered by him.”250  In this regard, Chief Judge Markey directly 
contradicted then-Judge Stevens’ opinion in Chicago Rawhide 
Mfg. Co.251 
Chief Judge Markey concluded that the trial court’s instruction 
that the presumption of validity “does not extend or exist as to 
prior art patents or publications which do not appear from the 
record of the file wrapper” and its refusal to give an instruction that 
it is “assumed that the examiner reviewed the prior art which was 
in the files which he searched” left the jury “unapprised of the full 
extent of the statutory presumption of validity.”252 
ix. The Ninth Circuit 
In one of the last Ninth Circuit cases to address the 
presumption of validity, the court held that a patent simply “was 
not presumed to be valid” when prior art was not considered by the 
USPTO.253  Indeed, in some cases the court held that the burden of 
proof on invalidity shifts to the patentee if the examiner did not 
review prior art later asserted in litigation or if the uncited prior art 
contains disclosure closer to the patented device than the 
disclosures of the prior art considered by the examiner.254  And 
some cases emphasized that “even one” unconsidered prior art 
reference may “overthrow the presumption of validity.”255 
Other cases, however, did not go quite that far.  For example, 
the Ninth Circuit also held that the presumption of validity “will 
disappear” only if the applicant failed to disclose “relevant” prior 
art to the USPTO.256  Other cases indicate that the presumption is 
“dissipated” when the examiner fails to consider “pertinent” prior 
art or that uncited prior art discloses “something not disclosed” by 
 
 250 Id. 
 251 See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
 252 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 620 F.2d at 1266–67. 
 253 Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 254 Penn Int’l Indus., Inc. v. New World Mfg., Inc., 691 F.2d 1297, 1300–02 (9th Cir. 
1982); Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 255 Jaybee Mfg. Corp. v. Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp., 287 F.2d 228, 229 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 256 Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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cited prior art.257  Furthermore, numerous cases in the Ninth 
Circuit applied a cumulativeness test to unconsidered prior art.258 
x. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is 
“considerably weakened if the patent examiner did not consider 
relevant prior art.”259  Indeed, it has held that the “strong 
presumption of validity” attributable to a “properly issued patent” 
is greatly diminished when the USPTO fails to consider relevant 
prior art.260  The court also has held that the presumption is 
strengthened when the trial court examined the “pertinent” prior art 
and concluded that the patent was not invalid.261 
Two of the Tenth Circuit opinions deserve special attention.  In 
the first case, Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of 
Oklahoma, Inc.,262 the court held that the USPTO’s “decision to 
issue a patent is entitled to deference only to the extent that it is 
based on relevant facts and on correct principles of law.”263  The 
court noted that if the USPTO failed to consider relevant prior art 
then “the basis for according deference vanishes.”264  It concluded 
that when unconsidered prior art reveals a substantial basis for 
challenging the USPTO’s decision to issue the patent, the district 
court must make a fresh assessment of validity, and that such a 
basis exists (1) if the USPTO overlooked prior art that is more 
pertinent than the art that it did consider or (2) if the USPTO 
overlooked prior art that is less pertinent than the art that it did 
 
 257 Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 664 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1982); NDM 
Corp. v. Hayes Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 258 Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 575 (9th 
Cir. 1982); Carson Mfg. Co. v. Carsonite Int’l Corp., 686 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Hammerquist v. Clarke’s Sheet Metal, Inc., 658 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Houston v. Polymer Corp., 637 F.2d 617, 619–20 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 259 Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 469 (10th Cir. 1982). 
 260 Norfin, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 625 F.2d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1980); see also 
M.B. Skinner Co. v. Cont’l Indus., Inc., 346 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1965) (indicating 
that the presumption of validity is rebuttable “particularly where” much of the prior art 
relied upon in litigation was not considered by the USPTO, but that commercial success 
may be considered as properly strengthening the presumption of validity). 
 261 Lam, Inc., 668 F.2d at 469. 
 262 708 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 263 Id. at 1558. 
 264 Id. 
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consider but that nevertheless substantially undermines its 
decision.265  Finally, the court also indicated that the “crucial 
inquiry” is not the relative pertinence of the unconsidered prior art 
but instead is whether the unconsidered art leads the court to 
reasonably question the USPTO’s decision.266  If this threshold 
level of doubt is reached, the Tenth Circuit explained, then the 
court must reassess the patent and conduct an independent 
examination of all pertinent prior art.267 
In the second case, Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck 
Kustom Boats and Products, Inc.,268 the court explained that the 
rationale for a strong presumption of validity is the expertise of the 
USPTO in determining when the conditions for patentability have 
been satisfied.269  Therefore, the court reasoned, when the USPTO 
has failed to take into account relevant prior art, “it cannot be said 
that that agency has fully brought its expertise to bear on the task 
at hand and the statutory presumption [of validity] is diminished or 
dissipated altogether.”270  Overcoming the presumption, however, 
does not, without more, invalidate the patent.271  Instead, the court 
explained, “once any highly relevant but unconsidered prior art is 
introduced, a fresh assessment of all the art new and old must be 
carried out without benefit to the patentee of the presumption.”272  
Also at issue in Sidewinder was the effect of a prior adjudication 
concerning the validity of the patent-in-suit.  The court noted the 
“high presumption of validity”273 ordinarily afforded to a prior 
adjudication favorable to the patentee, but held that “where 
relevant prior art was not before the court rendering the earlier 
adjudication of validity, that decision has little precedential 
value.”274 
 
 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 269 Id. at 205. 
 270 Id. at 206. 
 271 Id. at 206 n.6. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. at 206. 
 274 Id. at 207. 
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xi. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit was formed in 1981, just one year prior to 
the formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.275  In one of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s only cases addressing the presumption of 
validity—if not the only one—the court adopted the view that 
when pertinent, non-cumulative prior art was not considered by the 
USPTO, the burden upon the challenging party is lessened to a 
preponderance of the evidence.276 
The Court addressed nuanced issues with respect to the 
application of this standard.  In particular, the court addressed the 
issue of what degree of relevance uncited prior art must have 
before the burden is reduced to a preponderance of the evidence, 
and how to determine if the USPTO considered prior art.277  The 
patentee contended that the uncited prior art must be more 
pertinent than the prior art considered by the USPTO, and that the 
uncited prior art must be outside the patent classification areas of 
the prior art considered by the USPTO.278  The court rejected both 
of these positions. 
First, the court held that the presumption of validity is seriously 
eroded (and the preponderance burden of proof applies) if the 
patent challenger brings forward any relevant, uncited prior art.279  
The court cited the lack of any contrary authority, the duty of 
candor of patent applicants, and the anticompetitive effects of a 
patent as justification for such a strict rule.280  Significantly, 
however, the court noted that cumulative prior art references will 
not weaken the presumption of validity.281 
 
 275 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994. 
 276 Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1360–61, 1363–64 (11th 
Cir. 1982).  The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had gone even further than reducing 
the burden on the party challenging validity, instead holding that the failure to cite 
relevant prior art to the USPTO completely overturns the presumption of validity and 
shifts the burden of proof to the patent holder to demonstrate validity. Id. at 1361 (citing 
Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980)).   
 277 Id. at 1363–64.   
 278 Id. at 1363. 
 279 Id.  
 280 Id.   
 281 Id. at 1364.   
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Second, the court rejected the contention that a reference to a 
patent classification area compels the inference that the patent 
examiner considered and rejected all prior art in that 
classification.282  The court explained the impropriety of this 
inference, pointing to the large number of patents within each 
patent classification area and the testimony of the patentee’s own 
expert witness that patent examiners will sometimes miss highly 
pertinent prior art when searching.283 
xii. The District of Columbia Circuit 
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that the presumption 
of validity does not apply to prior art not cited by the USPTO and, 
like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, that even one uncited prior art 
reference overcomes the presumption.284  Similarly, the court has 
ruled that the presumption is weakened when an issue was either 
not the subject of a USPTO finding or an assumption underlying 
its finding is “demonstrably inaccurate in a material degree.”285  
And again, the court has held that the presumption of validity is 
“weakened” where the examiner did not consider closely prior art 
invoked in litigation.286 
By contrast, the court has found that a strong presumption of 
validity results from the fact that the USPTO is “an expert body 
pre-eminently qualified to determine” validity, that this 
presumption is reinforced where a district court sustains the 
USPTO, and that the appellate review is limited to searching for 
the lack of a “rational basis” for the conclusion on the issue of 
invalidity or the presence of a “thorough conviction” of error on 
this issue.287  Moreover, the court has held that unless new 
evidence brings “thorough conviction” that the USPTO was 
wrong, the court should accord to the USPTO a presumption of 
validity.288 
 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id.   
 284 Turzillo v. P. & Z. Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 285 Corning Glass Works v. Brenner, 470 F.2d 410, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 286 Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 287 Pro-Col Corp. v. Comm’r of Patents, 436 F.2d 296, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 288 Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. Brenner, 389 F.2d 927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1967); 
Hays v. Brenner, 357 F.2d 287, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Railex Corp. v. Joseph 
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C. The Benefits 
There are many benefits to reducing the burden of proof on the 
issue of invalidity for unconsidered, material prior art from clear 
and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence.  
Patent applicants would have an incentive to search for and 
disclose the most relevant prior art to the USPTO; patent quality 
would increase; patents would more often serve their constitutional 
purpose of rewarding inventors for disclosing their discoveries; 
and transaction costs associated with the licensing and litigation of 
ultimately invalid patents would be reduced.  These benefits reflect 
the policy-based support for a preponderance burden of proof for 
unconsidered, material prior art. 
1. Creating an Incentive to Search for and Disclose Relevant 
Prior Art 
Reduction of the burden of proof from clear and convincing 
evidence to a preponderance of the evidence for unconsidered, 
material prior art would create an incentive for patent applicants to 
search for and disclose relevant prior art to the USPTO.  As a 
reward for presenting prior art to the USPTO, the patent applicant 
would obtain (1) a higher burden of proof on the issue of invalidity 
if an alleged infringer later asserted the same prior art in litigation 
and (2) a higher burden of proof on the issue of invalidity if an 
alleged infringer latter asserted equally material or less material 
prior art in litigation.  Thus, to the extent a patent applicant could 
find and present to the USPTO prior art that is just as material as or 
more material than any other unknown prior art, the examiner’s 
consideration of the disclosed prior art would create an absolute 
clear and convincing burden of proof in litigation.  As discussed 
above, this behavior would fortify the presumption of validity upon 
which the clear and convincing burden of proof is based.289 
 
Guss & Sons, Inc., 382 F.2d 179, 182 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that it is “clear beyond 
doubt” that while a patent is presumed valid that presumption is rebuttable particularly 
where the prior art was not available or considered by the USPTO); Reynolds v. 
Aghnides, 356 F.2d 367, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the correctness of administrative action and reversing a district court order 
requiring the USPTO to issue a patent). 
 289 See supra Part II.C. 
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2. Increased Patent Quality, Just Rewards, and Reduced Costs 
By creating an incentive for patent applicants to find and 
disclose prior art to the USPTO, the quality of patents, in terms of 
their validity, would increase.290  The quid pro quo at the heart of 
the patent system would be justified more often; that is, more often 
the USPTO would consider patent applications in light of the most 
relevant prior art, and so more often it would issue patents only in 
exchange for disclosure of truly new and nonobvious inventions.  
Thus, the constitutional purpose of patents, to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts,291 would be more often and more fully 
realized.  In addition, significant costs would be avoided by 
preventing the unjust award of a patent in the first place.  The 
ability to collect monopoly profits based on truly invalid patents 
would be reduced, and there would be fewer expenses associated 
with license negotiations and less litigation involving truly invalid 
patents.292 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity, while 
clear, is not supported by any convincing rationale.  And while the 
Federal Circuit has held that Supreme Court precedent and the 
statutory presumption of validity require a clear and convincing 
burden of proof in every circumstance, neither does.  The Federal 
Circuit’s invalidity standard—clear and convincing evidence in 
 
 290 One school of thought is that the best examination of patent claims is in patent 
infringement litigation, not at the USPTO. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (concluding that “the [USPTO] 
doesn’t do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don’t want it to” 
because of the cost and the fact that “the overwhelming majority of patents are never 
litigated or even licensed”).  But if the USPTO is going to examine patent applications at 
all—and there is no indication that a registration system rather than an approval system is 
on the horizon—then the USPTO should be considering the most relevant prior art. 
 291 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 292 The Supreme Court has held that the statutory presumption of validity does not 
preclude application of estoppel in situations where a court previously held a patent 
invalid. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971).  In 
so ruling, the Court noted its precedent encouraging the authoritative testing of patent 
validity in light of severe economic consequences of assertions of invalid patents, 
including the expense of patent infringement litigation. Id. at 344–48. 
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every circumstance—should be replaced with a standard that 
reflects whether the factfinder believes the USPTO considered the 
most relevant prior art.  If the factfinder believes it did, then the 
clear and convincing burden of proof should apply.  If the 
factfinder believes it did not, then the preponderance burden of 
proof should apply.  The adoption of this new standard would 
recognize the realities of USPTO examination, reflect the 
precedent of the Supreme Court and all of the circuit courts other 
than the Federal Circuit itself, increase patent quality, and reduce 
transaction costs associated with licensing and litigating ultimately 
invalid patents.  In the end, patents would more often serve their 
constitutional purpose of rewarding inventors for disclosing true 
discoveries rather than recycled and obvious ideas. 
 
